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ABSTRACT
An assumption widely shared among Western observers is that 
the normalization of East-West relations will lead ultimately to a 
loosening of the bonds between the Soviet Union and its East European 
allies. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the evolution of 
the East European alliance system during the period of diminished 
tension between East and West.
The disintegrative tendencies within the alliance are by now 
well-known: Yugoslavia and Albania have successfully withdrawn from
the alliance; Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize" situations 
in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; and for a decade Rumania 
has pursued policies at odds with those of its allies. It would be 
premature, however, to see those developments as indicative of the 
dissolution of the alliance. A number of factors, not the least of 
which is the presence of the Red Army in four East European countries, 
are operating to maintain cohesion; and there is evidence to suggest 
that considerations of domestic political security may constitute a 
new cementing element in the alliance.
By 1970, it had become apparent that the process of change in 
the Soviet bloc had yielded a new form of relations among the states 
of Eastern Europe. Under the rubric of ’’socialist internationalism," 
this new form of relations has manifested itself in a new drive for 
economic integration, in an expansion of the political role of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization, in an intensive ideological campaign, and 
in a coordinated policy of cooperation with the West.
In an important sense, however, the unity of the past few 
years is deceptive, for among the East European leaders there are two 
opposing tendencies: one impelling them toward closer unity in the
interests of immediate political security, and the other impelling 
them to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union. Although 
the question of which impulse will prevail will be determined by the 
course of domestic events in Eastern Europe and by the progress of 
detente, the most likely outcome for the near future is what one 
Polish scholar has termed a "shifting of forces," a process whereby 
the states of Eastern Europe would be afforded greater room for 
maneuver within the existing alliance framework.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET BLOC
INTRODUCTION
The character of contemporary East-West relations is generally 
understood in terms of detente. No consensus exists, however, as to 
the precise meaning of detente or its implications. Though a 
distinction is commonly made between detente as a psychological 
phenomenon--implying a general relaxation of tension--and detente 
as a set of substantive policies, the meaning of detente remains a 
topic of debate.
Similar disagreement exists concerning the possible impact 
of detente on the Soviet-sponsored East European alliance system. 
Recent changes in the international environment--including the 
increased economic cooperation between East and West, the arms 
limitations agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and the various West German initiatives associated with Ostpolitik-- 
suggest the possibility of a profound systemic impact on the Eastern 
bloc. Simultaneously, however, the reiteration of the Brezhnev 
doctrine of limited sovereignty and the Soviet drive for ideological 
unity within the socialist system indicate a continued determination 
to maintain alliance cohesion.
The disintegrative tendencies within the Soviet bloc are by 
now well-known. Of the eight communist states in Eastern Europe, two 
have successfully withdrawn from the alliance: Yugoslavia, in 1948,
and Albania, in 1962. Though still a member of the alliance,
2
3Rumania has pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy line 
since the mid 1960s. Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize" 
crises in the alliance three times: in East Germany in 1953, in
Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Poland, too, 
submitted to strong Soviet pressure in resolving political crises in 
1956 and 1970. Of the East European alliance members, only Bulgaria 
has followed without serious challenge the prescribed Soviet line in 
both foreign and domestic policies.
The developments of the 1970s have introduced into the 
alliance a new set of potentially disruptive tendencies. The rapid 
expansion of East-West trade, as well as local variations in economic 
development, have seriously undermined established trade relations 
within the alliance. Additionally, the developing East-West detente 
and the stabilization of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe 
have diminished the military threat which the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
was formed to counter.
It would be premature, however, to see these developments 
as indicative of the dissolution of the alliance. A number of 
factors, not the least of which is the presence of the Red Army in 
several East European countries, are operating to maintain alliance 
cohesion. At the very least, the maintenance of close formal ties 
among the socialist states of Eastern Europe remains of vital 
importance to the political security of the various Party leaders. 
Ideological considerations aside, the simple fact of geographic 
proximity to a large and powerful neighbor severely limits the range 
of alternatives available to the East European countries.
4The conflicting developments of the past few years point to 
a need for a systematic study of the East European alliance in the 
period of developing detente between East and West. It is clear that 
the alliance is a vastly different one from that which existed, 
say, twenty years ago. The precise nature of the transformation, 
however, is far from clear. Are the ideological ties among the 
socialist states sufficiently strong to maintain cohesion? Will 
considerations of political security replace military considerations 
as a cementing element in the alliance? Will the alliance evolve 
into an authentic socialist commonwealth, in which each member would 
be afforded greater latitude to pursue independent policies? Or 
will the alliance simply disintegrate, to be replaced by a framework 
of bilateral and multilateral arrangements in Eastern Europe?
The year 1975 is particularly appropriate for an assessment 
of the Soviet bloc. It marks the conclusion of the long awaited 
agreement on security and cooperation in Europe. It also marks the 
twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact and the thirtieth anniver­
sary of the beginning of the Soviet bloc, which has already 
established itself as one of the more enduring alliances.
Alliances: Theories and Propositions
In the last twenty years, a vast number of theories and 
propositions concerning the behavior of international alliances have 
been advanced. The unfortunate truth is that there are not too few 
theories, but too many: for virtually every assertion concerning
alliance behavior, there exists another assertion stating the opposite
idea. Nevertheless, it is possible to list a few of the more widely 
shared, or at least the most commonly stated, theories and proposi­
tions about alliances.
Alliance theories generally fall into one of three categorie 
the formation of alliances, ‘alliance performance, and alliance 
duration and disintegration. What follows will be a survey of some 
of the more widely accepted propositions and of those which are 
particularly relevant to the alliance system in Eastern Europe.
Theories concerning alliance formation are concerned with
the questions of why alliances are formed and of what criteria are
involved in the decision to enter into an alliance. Most theorists -
agree that alliances are formed primarily to counter an external
threat. George Liska, for example, has argued that external threat,
rather than national strength or weakness, is the primary source of
alliances.1 Liska1s proposition was stated in somewhat different 
*
form by K. J. Holsti, who held that nations undertake alliance 
commitments with nations which face similar external problems.^ 
Although a case might be made for this line of argument as applied 
specifically to the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it 
is clear that the alliance system in its early stages was simply 
imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.
-^George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 13.
^K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co
1967), p. 110.
6Closer to the mark is a proposition by Harold Guetzkow, who 
held that the less successful a nation?s experience with self-reliant 
policies, the greater the tendency to join alliances.  ^ The fact 
that Eastern Europe has for centuries been consigned a dependency 
status has implications both for the reasons for the formation of the 
Soviet bloc and for its persistence. In a more specific sense, the 
geopolitical results of World War Two provided the Soviet Union with 
an opportunity to impose an alliance on East European leaders who 
were scarcely in a position to resist.
Theories related to alliance performance are concerned with 
the cohesion and effectiveness of alliances and with the distribution 
of influence within alliances. Probably the most widely stated of 
all the propositions about alliances is that cohesion depends upon 
external danger and declines as the threat is reduced. This hypo­
thesis, derived from the studies of small group behavior by German 
sociologist Georg Simmel,^ has been restated in one form or another
O
^Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial
Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 
(1957):54.
^Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1955),
pp. 92-93.
7by Kenneth Boulding, Arnold Wolfers, and many others.-*
If the hypothesis is valid, one would expect that the general 
relaxation of tension between East and West would have a profound 
and divisive impact on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and 
the Soviet bloc. The acceptance of this hypothesis has been reflected 
in Secretary of State Kissinger1s defense of the policy of ddtente 
as part of an evolutionary process leading to the liberalization of 
the societies of Eastern Europe and to the loosening of the East 
European alliance. In response to a question during the hearings on 
his nomination to be Secretary of State, Kissinger stated,
. . . about ten years ago it was axiomatic in the intellectual 
community and among students of foreign policy that the reason 
the Soviet system was able to maintain its authoritarian hold 
was because of its invocation of foreign danger, and that to the 
degree that the foreign danger diminished it would not be able 
to maintain the more repressive aspects of its system. And I 
believe that, in the long run, this will turn out to be a correct 
judgment, because, in a way, as we live in a world in which 
these countries become more related to the free countries and 
economically more interdependent, the pressures . . . are going
to become more numerous.^
Two other hypotheses, however, suggest the existence of
^Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 162; and Arnold
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962), p. 29.
For an extensive listing of these and other alliance 
theories, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. 
Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973),
Appendix C.
^f,Excerpts from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Hearings on the Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary 
of State," in Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969; expanded edition, 1974),
p. 211.
8cohesive factors in the alliance. Haas and Whiting argued in 1956 
that centralization of alliance decision-making contributes to 
greater cohesion.^ In this regard, the record of the East European 
alliance system is mixed: while it is clear that the Soviet Union
remains the dominant force, it is equally clear that the junior 
partners in the alliance have greatly improved their bargaining 
power within the decision-making structures. A related proposition 
advanced by Liska holds that ua hegemonic alliance would repress 
strains underneath the supremacy of the leading ally.*1^ The 
question which emerges from consideration of this proposition is 
whether the preponderant power of the Soviet Union is in itself 
sufficient to maintain cohesion in the alliance.
The third category of propositions about alliance behavior 
is concerned with alliance duration and disintegration. Host 
prominent among- these is the logical extension of the various 
hypotheses concerning external danger and alliance cohesion: as
external threat disappears, alliances disintegrate. Since external 
threat is not likely to disappear in any absolute sense, however, 
concern might better be directed toward the question of the extent 
to which the invocation of external danger acts as a genuine 
cohesive element affecting alliances.
A factor not yet mentioned is the role of ideology in
^Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International 
Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1956), p. 183.
®Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 73.
9alliances. Richard Lowenthal, Herbert Dinerstein and others have 
argued that common ideology may. provide a source of alliance unity, 
though Dinerstein adds that the need for ideological homogeneity 
betrays underlying tendencies toward disintegration.^ It should be 
added that under Marxism-Leninism, ideology takes on an added 
dimension: it affects the very legitimacy of the Communist Party.
As regards Eastern Europe, it is clear that any threat to the politi 
cal security of the Party leadership would provide a powerful 
inducement toward alliance unity.
In summary, the theoretical literature on alliance behavior 
constitutes a vast potential storehouse for the systematic investi­
gation of the East European alliance. Of the many propositions 
surveyed here, however, only a few have been applied to studies of 
the situation in Eastern Europe.
Recent Studies of the Soviet Bloc
The great majority of studies of the East European alliance 
have been traditional descriptive analyses. Even a brief survey of 
the major scholars would have to include such names as Bromke,
^Richard Lowenthal, "Factors of Unity and Factors of 
Conflict.11 Annals 349 (September 1963):107; and Herbert Dinerstein, 
"The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science 
Review 59 (September 1965):601.
10
Brzezinski, Ionescu, London, Rubinstein, and Ulam.^ Without 
necessarily endorsing Adam Ulam’s scornful reference to the Mnew 
and militant faith called behavioralism,it can fairly be said 
that most of the current knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe has come from the work of the area specialists. At least 
two factors may account for the persistence of traditional modes 
of analysis in Communist studies. First, the relative scarcity of 
reliable data precludes the application of scientific techniques 
in a number of areas of inquiry. Second, the supposed uniqueness 
of the Communist system has, until recently, deterred scholars from 
attempting comparative analyses.
The first attempt away from the area studies approach was 
the totalitarian model, which dominated Communist studies during the
l^A partial listing of books written or edited by these 
authors includes Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds.,
The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971 (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1967); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The 
Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1967); Ghita Ionescu, The Breakup of the Soviet 
Empire in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Kurt
London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1964); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Communist Political 
Systems (New York: New York University Press, 1966); and Adam
B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).
HAdam B. Ulam, **USA: Some Critical Reflections,*1
Survey 50 (January, 1964):57.
For another view, see Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet 
Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems
in Communist Studies,** Soviet Studies 19 (January 1968):
313-39.
11
1 21950s and the early 1960s. Useful as it may have been as an
alternative to traditional analysis, the totalitarian model failed
to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of change in
Communist systems. The problem was not that the model failed to
allow for change in any form, but that it limited itself to those
1 ^changes which were initiated by the regimes in power. J Moreover, 
the totalitarian model provided little insight into the nature of the 
Communist interstate system.
By the early 1960s, the totalitarian model was increasingly 
seen as inadequate for the analysis of Communist systems. It was 
argued, for example, that Friedrich and Brzezinski's five pre­
requisites for a totalitarian system had diminished in significance 
with the decline in ideology, the growth of bureaucratic elites, 
and the decline in terroristic police tactics.^ Among the alterna­
tive models presented were the model of the one-party state, the
•^The most prominent of the early books on totalitarianism are 
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1951); and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 
eds., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956).
For more recent studies, see Carl J. Friedrich, Jr., 
"Totalitarianism: Recent Trends," Problems of Communism 18 (May/June
1968):32-43; and Robert Burrowes, "Totalitarianism: The Revised
Standard Version," World Politics 21 (January 1969):272-294.
13por a discussion of totalitarianism and change, see 
Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Change in 
Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 1-32.
^Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, pp. 9-10; and Allan Kassof, "The Administered Society: 
Totalitarianism Without Terror«" World Politics 16 (July 1964):558-75.
12
bureaucratic model, and the structural-functional model.^
More importantly, scholars began to attach significance to
16change, rather than to stability, in Communist systems. The
proliferation of new models in the late 1960s reflected both an
emphasis on the process of change and an attempt to apply techniques
used in studies of non-Communist systems.^ In addition to analyzing
the processes of modernization and political development, recent
studies have been concerned with such factors as nationalism,
ideology, bureaucracy, and the roles of elites and interest groups
18in both national and cross-national studies. At the interstate 
level, the new concern with change was reflected in the "polycentrism"
15S ee, for example, Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative 
Politics of Movement Regimes," American Political Science Review 55 
(June. 1961):281-93; T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and 
Organizational Societies and the USSR," World Politics 16 (July 1964): 
539—57; and Frederick C . Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (New York: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1966).
16S ee, for example, Johnson, Change in Communist Systems; and 
Andrzej Korbonski, "The Prospects for Change in Eastern Europe,"
Slavic Review 34 (March 1975):219-39.
l^For an excellent discussion of recent trends in Communist 
studies, see Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects
for an Empirical Approach," American Political Science Review 62 
(March 1968):185-204.
18S ee, for example, Dennis Clark Pirages, Modernization and 
Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary
Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1971); Paul E. Einner, International 
Communism: Ideology, Organization, Strategy (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1963); H. Gordon Skilling, ed., Interest Groups in Soviet 
Politics(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971);
and Barry T. Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).
13
19literature of the mid- to late-1960s.
Finally, the so-called "behavioral revolution" has begun
20to have an impact on Communist studies. In the face of a number 
of constraints inherent in the study of closed political systems, 
however, behaviorally oriented Communist studies have achieved 
only limited success. Surveys of recent emigrants from Communist 
East Europe, for example, have been justly criticized for having 
been drawn from a biased sample. An encouraging sign for the 
behavioralists, however, is the recent accumulation of more reliable 
data, much of which is being generated from within the Communist 
countries themselves.
The continuing dichotomy between the behavioralists and the 
anti-behavioralists notwithstanding, it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that there is no one best method in Communist studies.
The most encouraging sign of the past few years is that the previous 
emphasis on stability has given way to concern for the nature and 
direction of change in Communist systems at both the national and 
international levels.
■^"Polycentrism," which in the strictest sense denotes the 
existence of multiple centers for the legitimate interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism, has been used by many scholars to describe the 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc.
See, for example, Richard T. deGeorge, The New Marxism (New 
York: Pegasus Publishing Co., 1968); and Walter Laqueur and Leopold
Labedz, eds., Polycentrism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962).
20For two recent collections of behavioral works, see Roger 
E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies 
(New York: Free Press, 1971); and Johnson, Change in Communist
Systems.
14
Alliance Transformation
Because of its commitment to a utopian ideology and because 
of the preponderant power of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc is 
an alliance particularly resistant to change. To an extent 
unparalleled in the history of alliances, stability in the Soviet 
bloc depends on the uniformity of its members. Both Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, on which the very legitimacy of the East European leaders 
rests, and practical political considerations preclude significant 
deviations from the accepted pattern of uniformity.
According to Lenin*s interpretation of Marx, history is 
governed by universally applicable laws of socioeconomic development 
which must be uniformly followed by the Communist parties in their 
•positions at the vanguard of the progression toward Communism.
Any manifestation among the Communist parties of different inter­
pretations of historical laws, therefore, weakens both the solidarity 
of the movement and the position of the parties within their own 
societies. Moreover, close cohesion of the states of the Soviet 
bloc is ideologically required for the simultaneous entry into 
socialism and for the eventual achievement of Communism on an 
international scale.
Closely related to the ideological imperatives of close unity 
are a number of practical political considerations. Hie preservation 
of political security in Eastern Europe requires the maintenance of 
existing patterns of control over the economy, the military, the 
press, and virtually every other area of political and social activity.
15
Since all states are said to be governed by the same historical laws, 
any change in the nature of political control in one state ultimately 
would raise demands for change in other states. The 1968 
Czechoslovak experiment to allow political participation outside of 
the Communist Party, for example, threatened political security 
throughout Eastern Europe.
Thus, cohesion acquires far greater importance in the Soviet 
bloc than it does, say, in the NATO alliance or in the Common Market. 
If the requirement for alliance cohesion has remained a constant 
theme in the Soviet bloc, however, the means by which that require­
ment has been satisfied have varied considerably. It can be said, in 
fact, that the major changes in alliance relationships have been 
associated with efforts to construct integrative links designed to 
promote cohesion through means short of coercion.
Although "cohesion" and "integration" are often used 
interchangeably, there is an important distinction between the 
terms: where "cohesion" denotes a uniformity of thought and action,
"integration" refers to the process whereby distinct units are linked 
in specific areas of their activities. In this vein, Liska has 
observed,
One may ask "how much cohesion?" referring to the degree 
that allies stay together and act together. And one may ask,
"how much integration?" implying how intimately allies must be^ 
tied together so that they cannot act separately. ^
The distinction is not merely a matter of semantics, for in an
^Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 116.
16
analysis of the Soviet bloc in particular, apparent conformity may 
obscure fundamental changes in interstate relations.
Where cohesion is seen as the degree of uniformity at a 
given time, integration is a dynamic process of growing interaction 
which produces greater interdependence and which may promote a more 
stable cohesion. Thus, the special concern of any analysis of 
alliance transformation, particularly in the Soviet bloc, is the 
process of integration.
Perhaps the most useful definition for this analysis is that 
of Horton Kaplan, who defined integrative processes as "processes 
which join systems or organizations with separate institutions and 
goals within a common framework providing for the common pursuit of at 
least some goals the common implementation of at least some policies.’ 
At the most basic level, then, an analysis of alliance transformation 
should be concerned with the nature and direction of change in the 
following elements: alliance purpose or function, the influence and
interests of alliance units, the structural framework of the alliance, 
and alliance policies. Accordingly, this analysis will assess the 
patterns of change in the alliance, primarily during the period from 
1956 to 1968, and will investigate the altered nature of alliance 
relations since 1970.
Despite the similarities of the invasion of Hungary in 1956 
and the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the period between
99^Morton A.. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.
17
those two dates was one of profound change in the Soviet bloc. 
Following the revolutionary upheavals in Eastern Europe in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the East European leaders were confronted 
with new demands which were ill served by the existing alliance 
framework. It was this deficiency which Nikita Khrushchev sought 
to remedy through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). During the same 
period, however, the impact of Sino-Soviet split on existing 
polycentric tendencies served to upset the ideological unity of the 
alliance and to introduce new disruptive tendencies into the bloc.
By the end of that period, the patterns of change in the 
bloc had generated a new form of alliance relations designed to 
serve new purposes. Under the rubric of "socialist internationalism," 
this new form of relations has been characterized by a new emphasis 
on voluntary cooperation and by acconmodation of pluralistic tendencies, 
moderated of course by continued Soviet predominance. Moreover, the 
new form of alliance relations became intimately tied to the 
emerging policy of cooperation with the West.
Where alliance developments in the 1950s and the early 1960s 
were determined by the profound domestic changes in Eastern Europe, 
the course of the alliance relations since that time has been 
primarily affected by the nature of external developments. In 
bilateral relations with the West and at the recently concluded 
European security conference, the Soviet bloc has demonstrated a 
new solidarity which reflects an awareness of both the possible 
benefits and the possible dangers of cooperation with the West.
18
Although it can be said that the nature of change in the 
Soviet bloc in the future will be determined by the progress of 
detente and by the course of events domestically in Eastern Europe, 
it is too early to specify the precise direction of that change. A 
number of trends in the alliance are only beginning to become 
apparent, and a number of contradictory developments have yet to be 
resolved. As one prominent scholar on Eastern Europe has noted,
The purpose of scholarly study should be to acquire knowledge 
about the relatively clear tendencies of the past and the much 
less discernible trends of the present, and to indicate a range 
of possible alternatives for the near future. It cannot, 
however, forecast which of these prospects will in fact material­
ize, nor foresee entirely new ones, which will, no doubt, make 
themselves evident in the long r u n . ^ 3
oo
H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East 
Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Co., 1966),
p. 228.
CHAPTER I
FROM BUDAPEST TO PRAGUE
By 1953, the foundations for the alliance system in Eastern 
Europe had been laid. In the East European states, the processes 
of state-building and the tasks of consolidating power had largely 
been achieved, and the more convulsive aspects of revolutionary 
social transformation had been endured. Everywhere loyal Stalinists 
were entrenched as leaders of the new socialist states.
Notably lacking in the Stalinist system were any formal 
institutions designed to promote integration within the bloc. Those 
institutions which did exist were designed more to meet existing 
demands than to form the basis for future integration. Cominform, 
established in 1948 to counter Yugoslav ambitions and to restore 
ideological purity to the bloc, lapsed into inactivity the following 
year. COMECON, founded in January of 1949 in response to the challenge 
of the Marshall Plan, may have been intended initially to supplement 
Cominform as a formal link in the system. After the initial meetings 
of 1949 and 1950, however, COMECON remained dormant until its revival 
in the late 1950s.
While the reasons for COMECON!s early failure will require 
elaboration in a subsequent section, it may be said at the outset 
that a major factor was Stalin1s preference for indirect methods of 
control in the alliance. In the Stalinist system, the only
19
20
significant formal ties among member states were the bilateral 
treaties signed between 1947 and 1952.^ While the treaties formally 
guaranteed the sovereignty of the People1s Democracies, they also 
formally prohibited the East European states from entering into 
alliances opposed by the Soviet Union. On balance, however, the 
treaties were significant more for what they obscured than for what 
they revealed about the Stalinist system.
Following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in 
1948, Stalin made it clear that "domesticism" would no longer be 
tolerated in Eastern Europe. 5^ Strict adherence to the Soviet 
line was achieved through a variety of means, including frequent 
consultations among top leaders, direct participation by Soviet 
ambassadors in East European domestic affairs, the threat of the 
Soviet army, and, above all, by the imposition of leaders trusted 
by Stalin. By 1953, each of the East European leaders had been 
personally approved by Stalin by virtue of previous Comintern service 
or on the basis of their successful employment of Stalinist methods 
within their own Parties.
Stalin himself, of course, constituted the most important link
24For a more detailed analysis, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts:"
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 107-12.
25For a discussion of the term and its implications for bloc 
affairs, see ibid., pp. 51-58, 67-83.
"Domesticism," in the strictest sense, refers to the pre­
occupation of East European leaders with domestic problems at the 
expense of the broader international goals of the Communist movement.
In a more general sense, the term refers to manifestations of differing 
interpretations of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
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in the system. As the successful builder of socialism in the Soviet 
Union and as the creator of the socialist system in Eastern Europe,. 
Stalin embodied the very direct source of legitimacy of the East 
European leaders and of the systems they had erected. The Stalinist 
system, successful as it was for the purposes of revolutionary social 
and political transformation, did not include the kind of cohesive 
elements which could endure. No stable framework existed for the 
containment of conflicts within the system; and basic economic, 
political, and military integration had been abandoned in favor of 
direct personal rule.
Stalinfs immediate legacy was a period of semiparalysis, both 
in the Soviet Union and in the bloc. Since all elements of Stalin's 
rule had been personal, his heirs were left with the task of 
reconstructing the bases for stability and cohesion. During the 
years immediately following Stalin's death in March of 1953, 
developments in Eastern Europe largely reflected the upheavals going 
on within the Soviet Union. The long-term impact of those develop­
ments, however, is still being felt.
The internal crisis in the Soviet Union culminated with 
Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which 
he vigorously denounced Stalin and his methods. In the East European 
states, a denunciation of Stalin could only be interpreted as a 
denunciation of the "little Stalins" in power throughout the bloc. 
While Khrushchev was undoubtedly motivated by concerns for consoli­
dating power domestically, he must have been aware of the catastrophic 
impact the speech would have in Eastern Europe. On balance, it
22
appears that Khrushchev's aim was to reshape the Stalinist legacy 
both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. In any case, the 
upheavals in Hungary and in Poland bore witness to the failure of 
the new Soviet leadership to successfully transform the Stalinist 
system it had inherited.
The Hungarian and Polish "Octobers"
Stalin was replaced in the Soviet Union by an unstable 
collective leadership headed by Georgi Malenkov, who, in the face 
of conflicting domestic pressures, announced a "new course" for the 
Soviet economy. Encouraged by the easing of world tensions following 
the Korean armistice, Malenkov apparently hoped to enhance the 
viability of the Soviet regime (and of the regimes of Eastern 
Europe) by redirecting the economy toward the production of more 
consumer goods.
The two principles of the Malenkov period, collective 
leadership politically and the New Course economically, had an 
immediate impact on the alliance system. Alterations in the Soviet 
model, still of profound importance to the system, in 1953 were 
duplicated with knee-jerk rapidity in the states of Eastern Europe. 
The Stalinist assertion that Soviet interpretations of the correct 
path to socialism "are binding upon all countries"^6 had been 
challenged only by Yugoslavia, and the political realities of the day 
dictated that no further challenge would be tolerated. The erratic
^Bolshevik. No. 17 (1948), as cited by Brzezinski, The 
Soviet Bloc, p. 77.
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course followed in Moscow after 1953, however, served to upset the 
monolithic quality of the alliance.
In most cases, the Malenkov reforms were adopted in Eastern 
Europe without serious political strains. The New Course, only the 
first of what was to be a series of measures toward economic reform, 
was adopted in varying degrees. The principle of collective leader­
ship, which meant in effect that the posts of Premier and First 
Secretary would not be held by one man, had a serious impact only 
in Hungary.
The principal recipient of Soviet accusations of economic 
excesses in Hungary was Matyas Rakosi, the Moscow-trained First 
Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Accordingly, the New 
Course in Hungary was conceived and announced by Imre Nagy, who had 
assumed the post of Premier in keeping with the principle of 
collective leadership. It seems clear that either Rakosi or Nagy 
alone might have been able to implement the plan without crisis-- 
Rakosi through the continued use of Stalinist methods and Nagy by 
a partial liberalization of domestic policies. The combination of 
the two, however, coupled with the erratic policies emanating from 
Moscow, set in motion conflicts which could not easily be resolved.
The reversal of the Soviet New Course following Khrushchev*s 
elevation to the Premiership in 1954 seemed to constitute an implicit 
endorsement of Rakosi. Before Rakosi was able to consolidate power, 
however, his position was hopelessly undercut by Khrushchev*s 
de-Stalinization speech. Neither Rakosi's compromise plan nor the 
short-lived Gero government was able to stem the tide of reform which
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began in 1953. Nagy, who had systematically been forced into a 
position of strict national communism, was appointed Premier on 
October 23, 1956. The well-known events of October and early 
November, 1956, ended in the Soviet liquidation of the Nagy government.
While the events in Hungary can scarcely be said to be 
representative of developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe, they are 
instructive in that all of the potentially disruptive elements at 
work in the system converged at once. Hungary, which had endured 
one of the most repressive Stalinist regimes, was particularly 
ill-prepared in 1953 to sustain erratic tampering with the sources 
of political authority. Encouraged by the course of events in
tr
Poland, dissident groups in Hungary began to press for far-reaching 
domestic reform. Once the previous source of governmental legitimacy—  
Stalin--had been repudiated, the leadership was forced to turn 
inward to erect a new basis for legitimacy. That this search took 
on a decidedly anti-Soviet tone wa.s symptomatic of the forces at 
work within the alliance system.
When the Soviet army intervened in Hungary on October 24 
and again on November 4, it did so in clear violation of Articles 
1 and 8 of the recently signed Warsaw Pact. If Khrushchev had hoped 
that the Warsaw Treaty Organization would assist in containing 
crises within the system, his hopes were not realized in 1956. While 
the Treaty was mentioned as one of the many justifications for the
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Soviet action,27 the Warsaw Treaty Organization never specifically 
endorsed the intervention, nor did it respond to Nagy's accusation 
that the Pact had been violated. Despite its inaction— or perhaps 
because of it--the Warsaw Pact continued to figure highly in 
Khrushchev's plans for a restructured alliance system.
It should be noted that each of the East European Communist 
regimes, including the Yugoslav regime, did unilaterally endorse 
the intervention. In addition to the ideological implications of 
the possibility of a Communist state "going neutral," the developments 
in Hungary posed a clear threat to the maintenance of Party control 
elsewhere in the bloc. With the possible exception of Gomulka in 
Poland, it is clear that none of the East European leaders was 
reluctant to .endorse the Soviet action, and it is likely that most 
welcomed the added measure of political security.
The same forces at work in Hungary revealed themselves in 
somewhat different form in Poland, though with quite different 
results. The death of Stalin, the early experimentation of Malenkov, 
and particularly the Soviet criticism of the activities of the secret 
police all served to set off a wave of criticism and reevaluation * 
in Poland. The defection of a high ranking Polish secret police 
officer and his subsequent revelations about the police activities 
in Poland contributed to growing public resentment of the role of 
the Party in Polish society. What began with the questioning of some
27The various justifications for the invasion are discussed 
in Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International Conciliation, 
no. 573 (May 1969), p. 24.
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Stalinist practices quickly spread to unprecedented official question­
ing of the role of the parliament, the viability of economic programs, 
and the methods of the Politburo.
In the wake of workers1 riots in Poznan and increasing 
domestic dissent, the Polish leadership became increasingly divided. 
The* principal issues dividing the two factions seem to have been 
domestic policies, Poland’s relationship to the Soviet Union, and 
the position of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been imprisoned in 1948 
for advocating the "Polish road to socialism." Events came to a 
head when the Polish army refused to act to suppress a second 
workers* riot on October 18, 1956.
The following day, a Soviet delegation arrived uninvited 
in Warsaw to discuss the situation. It is apparent that the Soviet 
leaders came to realize that developments in Poland had gone beyond 
the point where the domestic crisis in Poland could be resolved on 
Soviet terms. For a number of reasons the Soviet delegation, like 
the Polish leadership, had come to realize that Gomulka alone could 
resolve the domestic conflicts in Poland without seriously damaging 
Soviet-Polish relations. With a wide mandate to pursue a separate 
course toward viability in Poland, Gomulka emerged from the crisis 
as the symbol of renewal.
The Soviet response to the events in Poland represented a 
new willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to recognize 
the existence and validity of differences among the states of Eastern 
Europe. This new orientation was made explicit in the following 
excerpt from a Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956:
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The process of establishing the new system and implementing 
far-reaching revolutionary reforms of social relationships was 
attended by no small number of difficulties, unsolved problems 
and outright mistakes, which extended also to relations between 
the socialist countries. . . . The Twentieth Congress declared 
that full account must be taken of the historical past and speci-
0 0
fic features of each country. . . . 0
The break with the past was, on the surface at least, complete. 
Stalin had been denounced, past mistakes had been admitted, and the 
possibility of separate roads to socialism had been acknowledged. 
Throughout the bloc surviving Stalinist leaderships responded to 
demands for domestic reform through largely repressive methods.
Nowhere, however, did the patterns of domestic control retain the 
authoritarian hold exercised before 1956. The task which remained 
was to replace the discredited Stalinist system with a framework 
which could restore a measure of cohesion to the alliance.
Toward a New Cohesion
The cohesion Khrushchev sought was one based on a more 
complex and resilient pattern of interrelationships among the 
socialist states. Specifically, he saw the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
and COMECON as the basic elements of a new and viable alliance.
The first task, however, was to reestablish the ideological founda­
tions of the socialist system, which had been termed "polycentric” 
by Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti as early as
O Q
^ “Declaration by the Soviet Government on Principles of 
Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship Between the Soviet 
Union and Other Socialist States,’ October 30, 1956,” in International 
Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 92.
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June of 1956.29
Clearly, the events of 1956 had raised a number of questions 
which had not been satisfactorily resolved. The issues of greatest 
importance were the definition of the "correct” road to socialism, 
the historical meaning of Stalin and Stalinism, and the position of 
the Soviet Union in the socialist system. Following a series of 
bilateral and multilateral meetings among top party leaders, a 
conference of representatives of all the Communist countries met in 
Moscow in November of 1957. The conference declaration, which was 
signed by the representatives of all the Communist countries except 
Yugoslavia, warned against both dogmatism and revisionism and affinned 
the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).^O
As a consequence of the absence of any institutional framework
for the resolution of ideological differences,^ the pattern of 1957 
was repeated in subsequent ideological conferences. The 1960 
meeting reaffirmed the "vanguard" position of the CPSU, but at. the 
1965 and subsequent conferences no special precedence was accorded 
the Soviet Union. In fact, it could be said that the development of 
more elaborate interstate relations was paralleled by the gradual
29”Togliatti1s Speech on *Polycentrism* to the Central 
Committee of the Italian Communist Party, June 24, 1956," in 
International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967),
pp. 87-90.
^^"Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of 
Communist and Workers* Parties of Socialist Countries, November 22, 
1957," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. 
McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co.,
1967), pp. 98-101.
•^Cominform was officially dissolved April 17, 1956.
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deterioration of interparty relations.^2 Nevertheless, the newly 
acknowledged principles of "complete equality" and "state indepen­
dence" had established the basis for a new system.
Founded in May of 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
represented the first institutionalized expression of the new form 
of relations in the system. For the first five years of its 
existence the WTO, like COMECON in its early years, was little more 
than a shell for the future development of an integrative framework.
As a political and military counterweight to NATO, the WTO did prove 
useful during the Geneva Conference as a symbol of unity in Eastern 
Europe. WTO also proved useful as a forum for the announcement 
of such decisions as troop reductions in Eastern Europe and the 
removal of Soviet troops from Rumania. It was not until 1961, 
however, that any serious steps were taken toward military integration 
in the bloc; and until the late 1960s it was difficult to discern 
any WTO defense policy which amounted to anything beyond a simple 
extension of the Soviet defense system. As for WT0*s activity as 
an agency for political integration, there is little evidence to 
suggest that until the 1970s the organization functioned as a genuine 
forum for political consultation.
Nevertheless, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has served a 
number of functions. First, as has already been mentioned, it
^This argument is developed by Nish Jamgotch, Jr., in 
Soviet--East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New
Type? (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968),
pp. 89-126.
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provided at least the beginnings of a unified East European defense 
command. Second, it provided an additional legal basis for the 
continued presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. While such 
justification was probably not essential, it was in keeping with the 
new Soviet emphasis on "socialist legality" in both domestic and 
foreign policies.
The third principal function of WTO has been its use as a 
means of replacing the dysfunctional Stalinist control devices with 
a new framework for the tightening of Soviet military control in 
Eastern Europe. With the departure of such direct Soviet military 
officials as Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had been the Minister of 
Defense in Poland, it became increasingly obvious that a less visible 
form of Soviet control was necessary. Additionally, the refusal of 
Polish troops to repress the workers' riots in October, 1956, must 
have confirmed Soviet fears about the reliability of the national 
armed forces in Eastern Europe. While the extent of Soviet control 
over the East European military has become a matter of some dispute,^3 
it is undeniable that the WTO has been the principal agent of efforts 
toward tighter Soviet control.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the WTO, however, is 
its existence as a formal body for the possible development of
integrative links in the future. While little is known about the
workings of the Consultative Committee and its auxiliary bodies, it
33por a more complete analysis, see Robin Alison Remington,
The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971),
pp. 19-23.
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is clear that the important political decisions have been made outside 
of the formal framework. The fact that the realities of the opera­
tions of the organization has not reflected its formal constitution, 
however, should not obscure the importance of WTO's potential for 
the development of a viable integrative framework in the future.
The second pillar of the emerging system, COMECON, was 
clearly anachronistic at its inception. It is obvious now, and it 
must have been obvious to Stalin in 1949, that the local requirements 
of rapid industrialization were incompatible with regional economic 
integration and coordination of national trade. It may be true 
that the original purposes of COMECON were related to immediate 
needs, such as preventing Poland and Czechoslovakia from partici­
pating in the Marshall Plan or establishing a forum for the 
coordination of national economic plans. On balance, however,
Stalin*s establishment of COMECON seems to have been motivated by 
an awareness of the inadequacy of the integrative links in Eastern 
Europe and by a desire to initiate a framework for the future 
development of economic integration in the system.
In any case, COMECON remained inactive from 1950 until after 
Stalin*s death, and its Charter was not signed until 1960. COMECON 
activity increased in 1954, as the Council met four times between 
1954 and 1956 to discuss problems of coordination of national plans 
and economic specialization. The creation of nine Standing Commissions
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in 1956^4 provided the first permanent framework for the discussion 
of problems related to specific fields of activity. More importantly, 
the Standing Commissions, which had grown in number to twenty-one 
by 1962, established a base for the future expansion of COMECON 
activities.
COMECON*s institutional framework, like that of the WTO, 
consists of organs with vaguely defined powers. The Standing 
Commissions and the COMECON Council are empowered to make recommenda­
tions, but in no cases are their decisions binding on the member 
states. As in the case of a Soviet administrative agency, COMECON*s 
structure is designed to conceal rather than to specify the nature 
of the decision-making process. Perhaps in response to the growing 
success of economic integration in Western Europe, the decision was 
made in the early 1960s to upgrade the integrative activities of 
COMECON.
The COMECON declaration on "Basic Principles of the 
International Socialist Division of Labor,*' signed on June 7, 1962, 
represented the first serious step toward economic integration in 
Eastern Europe. The principal objectives of the new program, 
improved coordination of national economic development and restructured 
patterns of economic exchanges among members, were to be achieved 
through the COMECON Executive Committee, which was created in 1962 to
3^The original Standing Commissions were concerned with oil and 
gas, coal, electricity, ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, machine build­
ing, agriculture, foreign trade, and atomic research.
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35act as a genuine supranational body. As was made clear in a subse­
quent article by Chairman Khrushchev, the ultimate goal of the pro­
gram was that of "building the socialist world economy into a single 
entity
By July of 1963, however, Khrushchev had abandoned his 
ambitious plan.37 Opposition to the Basic Principles program was 
directed toward two specific concerns. First, the contemplated 
program for the division of labor would have meant, in effect, that 
the less developed bloc members would be relegated to a status of 
suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products. Such a 
program was clearly incompatible with the domestic and ideological 
requirement of rapid industrialization. Second, the planned creation 
of a supranational agency, which doubtless would have been constituted 
in such a way as to ensure Soviet predominance, was viewed as a 
violation of the principle of national sovereignty so recently 
articulated by Chairman Khrushchev. Arguing against the creation of 
a "single planning body," the Rumanian Worker’s Party issued a 
statement declaring that "the planned management of the national
^For an analysis of the origins of the Executive Committee, 
see Andrzej Korbonski, "The Evolution of COMECON," in International 
Political Communities : An Anthology. Anchor Books (Garden City,
New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 359-67.
36Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development 
of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September, 
1962):9.
37For an analysis of the reasons for Khrushchev's decision, 
see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue, pp. 79-88.
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economy is one of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty 
of the socialist state."38 Similar reservations were expressed by 
Hungary and Poland.
Despite the failure of the attempt to integrate "from the 
top down," substantial success was achieved through more limited 
bilateral and multilateral projects. The number of Standing 
Commissions continued to increase through the 1960s, and a number 
of bilateral treaties were signed to facilitate the gradual 
coordination of national plans. Additionally, a number of joint 
production plans, such as the "Friendship" pipeline and an integrated 
power grid, were adopted. It was not until 1971, however, that 
another attempt was made to promote large-scale integration.
The failure of the 1962 program revealed the existence of 
a number of factors militating against successful economic inte­
gration. In the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign, leaders in 
Eastern Europe had been forced to emphasize national considerations 
in order to restore authority, and they were understandably reluctant 
to submit to any supranational planning body. Even in an abstract 
sense, economic integration among countries with centrally planned 
economies presents a number of p r o b l e m s . 39 xhe difficulties of
“^ "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker’s Party 
Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class 
Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among Communists, 
ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.
39j?or a more complete analysis of the problems of integration 
in the bloc, see Jozef M. P. van Brabant, Essays on Planning in 
Eastern Europe. (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), pp. 7-42.
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introducing uncertain external market forces into a planned economy 
could probably be surmounted only through the activities of a 
supranational agency. Such an agency would be supported in Eastern 
Europe only if it were so constituted as to ensure equal participa­
tion among members. While economic integration on equal terms 
remains a possible development for the future, genuine integration 
is not likely so long as Soviet and East European leaders continue 
to differ as to its basic constitution.
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split -*
The failure of the 1962 economic plan was only one manifes­
tation of the growing disunity in the alliance. Even before the 
Sino-Soviet split had escalated to the point of open enmity, the 
very success of the Chinese experiment represented a challenge to 
Soviet domination in the Communist movement. The Chinese announce­
ment^ in 1958 that China was on the threshold of Communism 
strengthened the position of those who argued in favor of "many roads 
to socialism." For the surviving "little Stalins" in Eastern 
Europe, Maoism provided an attractive alternate source of legitimacy.
The impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Eastern Europe has 
been largely indirect. Aside from the special case of Albania, only 
in Bulgaria, which briefly attempted its own "Great Leap Forward," 
were Chinese domestic policies directly adopted. The indirect
40’’Concerning the Creation of the People’s Communes in the 
Village," Jen Min Jih Pao. September 10, 1958, as cited by 
Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc, p. 370.
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impact of the split, however, has been profound. Not only did the 
manifestation of "polycentrism*1 further weaken ideological unity in 
the bloc, but the Soviet preoccupation with the Chinese challenge 
provided the East European leaders with increased latitude to 
pursue independent policies.
The East European country‘most directly influenced by China
was, of course, Albania. Guided primarily by fears of Yugoslav
domination and concern for consolidation of power domestically,
the Albanian leaders came to look to China as a source of external
support. At the same time, Albania, which had never reversed its
course of domestic Stalinism, came under increasing attack from the
Soviet Union, particularly during the CPSU Twenty-second Congress.
As early as 1960 Albanian leaders accused the Soviet Union of
attempting to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact.^ By 1961
the Soviet Ambassador had left Albania, and by 1962 Albania-was
/ o
de facto excluded from the alliance system. In terms of the 
alliance as a whole, the impact of Albania*s exclusion was minimal. 
On balance it would seem that Albania*s participation in the system, 
never of vital importance, was by 1962 more a liability than an 
asset.
Of far greater significance to the system was the growing
^BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Summary of Hoxha's 
Speech to the November, 1960, Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, 
as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 49.
^Albania formally withdrew from WTO in 1968 and continues 
to be a nonparticipating member of COMECON.
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independence of Rumania. Rumania*s geographic proximity to the Soviet 
Union and its economic backwardness should have made it a "safe*1 ally 
from the Soviet point of view. Yet by maintaining firm domestic 
control and by adopting a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, Rumania was able to exploit its own weakness to expand its 
room for maneuver within the alliance.
In April of 1958 a joint Sino-Rumanian statement called for 
the removal of "armed forces stationed on foreign territory.
While the subsequent Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from 
Rumania may not have been a direct consequence of the joint demands, 
it is likely that a major factor was the Soviet desire to minimize 
Chinese influence in Eastern Europe through a gesture of accommodation. 
In any case, Rumania continued to be the principal beneficiary of 
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
By 1963 Khrushchev was firmly committed to isolating the 
People’s Republic both organizationally and ideologically. The 
1962 COMECON plan and the initiation of joint WTO military maneuvers 
in 1961 were both conceived*with the Chinese problem in mind. Not 
surprisingly, the principal opposition to both endeavors came from 
the Chinese and the Rumanians. Throughout 1963 and 1964 Khrushchev 
attempted in vain to gather sufficient support in Eastern Europe to 
convene an international conference in which the Chinese would be 
denounced and the Soviet Union acclaimed the leader of the
^3'*Sino-Rumanian Joint Statement," April 14, 1958, as cited 
by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 62.
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international Communist movement. His failure, due in part to 
Rumania’s assumption of the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, was the final blow to his hopes for unity in the alliance.
By 1964, it was clear that Khrushchev*s policies had escalated 
the Sino-Soviet dispute without improving the Soviet position in 
Eastern Europe. His position already weakened by a number of other 
setbacks, Khrushchev was replaced in October of 1964 by the collec­
tive leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin. The first 
order of business of the new Soviet leadership was to reverse the 
deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe. In light of the continuing 
divisions in COMECON, efforts toward improving economic relations 
were confined to fostering bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
By the time of the Warsaw Pact’s tenth anniversary, it was clear 
that the major efforts of the new leadership would be in the 
direction of expanded military integration.
Joint WTO military maneuvers had been held on a regular 
basis since 1961, and the practice of placing East European military 
leaders in command of certain exercises had been followed since 1962. 
Though the precise nature of the WTO integrated command structure is 
not known, it is certain that the Soviet Union plays the dominant 
role. The most explicit condemnation of Soviet, influence in WTO 
was made in July of 1968 by a Czech Lieutenant General, who 
asserted that the joint command is formed by "marshals, generals, 
and officers of the Soviet army and that the other member armies
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have only their representatives in this joint command."44 Soviet 
officers, holding the titles of Members of Joint Supreme Command of 
the Warsaw Pact Forces, are known to play active roles in the national 
armed forces of WTO members. While Soviet motives regarding the 
integrated command are clear enough, the extent of Soviet influence 
should not be exaggerated. Strong nationalist factions continue 
to exist, particularly in the Polish and Rumanian armies; and 
Bulgaria officially reported an attempted coup by a nationalist
A C
faction within the Bulgarian army in 1965.
In any case, Brezhnevfs efforts toward "further perfecting 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization11^  met with some opposition in Eastern 
Europe, particularly from Rumania. In 1966 Rumania repeated, in 
a strongly anti-Soviet context, an earlier call for the liquidation 
of all military blocs. The alliance was rapidly becoming polarized 
over the issue of the Warsaw Pact and its relationship to the West. 
Rumania’s policies were viewed with increasing concern, especially 
in East Germany, which continued to view the WTO as vital to its 
political security.
44nReport on Press Conference with Lieutenant General Vaclav 
Prchlik, Head of the State Administrative Section of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee," July 15, 1968, in 
Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, ed.
Robin Alison Remington (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969),
p. 218.
45por an analysis of military integration in the bloc, see 
Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," pp. 36-37.
46Brezhnev*s Speech to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship 
Rally, Pravda, September 16, 1965, as cited by Remington, The 
Warsaw Pact, p. 83.
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During the same period, Rumania began to see cooperation 
with the West as a means of loosening the Soviet hold in Eastern 
Europe. Having led the drive for a pan-European conference on 
security and cooperation the previous year, Rumania exchanged 
recognition with West Germany in 1967. The establishment of 
Rumanian— West German diplomatic relations was seen a’s a direct 
threat, not only to the security of the northern states of the 
alliance, but to the Pact itself, established initially as a 
defensive measure against West German revanchism.
The disunity resulting from Rumanian policies was undoubtedly 
high on the agenda at the international Communist conference held 
in Karlovy Vary in 1967. Although a measure of unity was evident 
in the conference resolution, Rumania--having refused to attend 
the conference— was not among the signatories. There was little 
time left to restore unity in the alliance, however, for by 1967 
attention was being turned to developments of more immediate concern 
in Czechoslovakia.
The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath
A major legacy of the Khrushchev years was a wave of domestic 
economic reform in Eastern Europe. Enunciated in the Soviet Union 
in 1962, the reforms were adopted with various results in Eastern 
Europe in the mid 1960s. The Soviet reforms, designed to modify 
the archaic Stalinist bureaucratic system, included the granting 
of partial autonomy to individual enterprises, the use of economic 
incentives to stimulate production, and the creation of a rotation
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system among Party and state officials. The reforms were gradually 
phased out in the Soviet Union, but not before they had an impact 
in Eastern Europe.
The reforms, often termed the New Economic Mechanisms (NEM) , 
were adopted in most cases without serious problems. Hungary and 
East Germany achieved substantial success with their NEM, though 
East Germany gradually reversed some of the reforms for fear of 
a possible liberalizing effect on East German society. In Rumania 
and Bulgaria, the reforms were initiated with little enthusiasm 
and later phased out. Initially repressed in Poland, reforms were 
gradually implemented following the riots of 1968 and 1970.
The developments in Czechoslovakia, in many respects 
reminiscent of Hungary's experience with the New Course, led to 
a political crisis. The Czech leader, Antonin Novotny, responded 
to the initial wave of reform in Eastern Europe by going on a 
neo-Stalinist offensive. Novotny's repressive measures, aggravated 
by a full-scale economic slump in 1962-1963, led to growing domestic 
criticism among intellectuals and economists. Supported by an 
increasingly vocal group of dissidents, economists denounced the 
"cult of the plan" as a version of the discredited "cult of 
personality.
The economic reforms, finally adopted in 1966, were imple­
mented in an atmosphere of domestic chaos. As was the case in Hungary
^For a summary of the program announced by Czechoslovak 
Professor Ota Sik, see Remington, Winter in Prague: Documents on
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, pp. 32-36.
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in 1956, the leadership became critically divided between those who 
demanded reform and those who were committed to the Novotny 
government. To the already serious situation was added the issue 
of Slovak nationalism. The Slovak Party, led by Alexander Dubcek, 
.vigorously supported reform of the centralized political system 
which had been dominated by Czechs.
In October of 1967, brutal police repression of student 
demonstrations served to unite the factions opposed to Novotny's 
rule. Unable to maintain support in the Central Committee and unable 
to secure Soviet endorsement of his position, Novotny was replaced 
by Dubcek as Party First Secretary. Though obviously committed 
to domestic reform, Dubcek never seemed fully in command of the 
situation. By the time of the hastily conceived Party Action 
Program, which would have guaranteed democratic elections in the 
Party and which would have dramatically liberalized domestic policies, 
events in Czechoslovakia were being viewed with great concern in 
Eastern Europe.
Clearly, any basic change in the nature of Party rule in 
Czechoslovakia had profound implications for the political security 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. While the Dubcek government never 
attempted to pursue the kind of neutralist policy asserted by 
Hungary in 1956, its policies were viewed as a direct threat to the 
alliance. Though later justifications for intervention would 
include mention of Czech collaboration with West Germany, the central 
issue was the course of domestic and political reform in 
Czechoslovakia.
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The first bloc attempt to contain the Czech crisis was the 
Dresden meeting in March, a meeting which Rumania characteristically 
refused to attend. In May, Warsaw Pact forces conducted joint 
exercises in Poland, near the Czech border. The next exercises, 
held in June on Czech territory and followed by a long delay in the 
withdrawal of WTO troops, were obviously intended as a warning to 
the Dubcek government. Heeding the warning, Czech leaders met with 
a Soviet delegation in Cierna and again in Bratislava during July 
and August. Less than three weeks after the apparent compromise 
at Bratislava, however, the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact 
allies— East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria--invaded 
Czechoslovakia.
The invasion was as disastrous politically as it was 
successful militarily. Not only did the Warsaw Pact forces fail 
to produce the loyal comrades they ostensibly had come to assist, 
but they failed to persuade Svoboda, who had replaced Novotny 
as President, to form a new government. Ultimately, the Soviet 
Union was forced to accept DubcekTs continued leadership until his 
final ouster the following April.
Throughout the conflict, Rumania had refused to participate 
in Warsaw Pact activities. Despite Rumania's exposed position, 
President Ceausescu vigorously denounced the Pact's interference 
in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. In order to erase any 
doubts about Rumania's determination, Ceausescu activated the 
People's Militia and announced his intention to respond with force to
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any violation of the Rumanian border. ° Rumania was far from alone 
in its condemnation of the intervention. Aside from the countries 
which actually participated in the intervention, virtually every 
Communist party, whether in power or out, echoed the Rumanian 
denunciation.
The official Soviet justification for the intervention was
an appeal by an unidentified group of members of the Czechoslovak
49Communist Party Central Committee. The subsequent theoretical 
justification made it clear that the Soviet Union considered the 
defense of socialism, as defined and interpreted by the Soviet 
Union, to be its international right and duty. It is interesting 
to note that this justification, which has become known as the 
Brezhnev Doctrine * did not mention the Warsaw Pact or its role in 
the invasion. Only through oblique reference to the threat of West 
German revanchism was the Warsaw Treaty used as an explicit justifi­
cation for the action.
Despite the fact that the 1968 crisis eventually led to the 
use of force, it should be noted that the alliance system was able 
to demonstrate considerably more flexibility than it did in 1956. 
Unlike the unilateral invasion of 1956, the Czechoslovak invasion 
was conducted by five members of the WTO after extensive consultation.
AO
^ Scinteia. August 21, 1968, as cited by Remington, The 
Warsaw Pact, p. 107.
49nAppeal by Group of Members of CCP Central Committee and 
CSR Government and National Assembly,11 Pravda, August 22, 1968, as 
translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 20, September 
' 11, 1968, pp. 3-5.
45
Had the Czechoslovak leadership heeded the warnings implicit in the 
May and June maneuvers, it is even conceivable that the use of force 
could have been averted. The fact that the crisis did result in the 
use of force, however, was an indication of a need for a comprehensive 
integrationist program. Such a program was to be an essential part 
of Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe after 1968.
CHAPTER II
AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT
The events of 1968 bore witness to the failure of East 
European integration as conceived by Nikita Khrushchev a decade 
earlier. Although the joint participation of the Warsaw Pact allies 
bestowed a degree of legitimacy to the intervention, the fact that 
coercion became necessary betrayed the insufficiency of the inte­
grative mechanisms in the system. Two major lessons emerged from 
the experience: that the failure to construct a viable framework
for consultation and coordination had allowed events in 
Czechoslovakia to exceed acceptable limits, and that the failure 
to achieve basic economic integration had denied the Soviet Union 
and its allies the possibility of bringing economic sanctions to 
bear on its wayward ally.
Clearly, the alliance system of 1968 was a considerably 
more flexible and sophisticated one than that which had existed 
under Stalin. An institutional framework had been constructed on 
the basis of state sovereignty, and, within certain vaguely defined 
limits, pluralistic tendencies within the alliance had been tolerated 
and even accommodated. The far-reaching 1962 COMECON integration 
program had failed, but substantial success had been achieved through 
bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures. Finally, military 
integration through the WTO served as the basis for growing
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institutionalization of Soviet military control in the bloc.
By the mid 1960s, the evidence of change in the Soviet 
bloc had convinced many Western observers that the pattern of direct 
Soviet influence had been replaced by a new, more equitable form of 
relations. Writing in 1966, for example, one analyst concluded:
A reversion to the charismatic/terroristic policy of Stalin 
or the military interventionism of 1956 is out of the question. . . 
The essence of Soviet relations with East Europe is now 
negotiation--a process of multilateral and bilateral dealings 
with leaderships which, although certainly not equal to the 
Soviets in power and prestige, are sufficiently autonomous to 
preclude any form of direct Soviet dictation.^
As the events of 1968 demonstrated, however, the Soviet leaders did
return to the pattern of direct dictation, and they did so with the
willing support of most of their Warsaw Pact allies.
Thus, for Western analysts, the intervention of 1968 seemed 
to bear out the old dictum, "The more things change, the more they 
stay the same." While many analysts correctly identified the forces 
at work in the Soviet bloc, the conclusions they reached were often 
based on false assumptions about the process of integration in the 
Soviet bloc.
Integration Theories Reconsidered
Perhaps the most widely accepted view among Western observers 
during the 1960s was that the forces at work in Eastern Europe were 
leading inevitably to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Writing 
in 1965, for example, Herbert Dinerstein argued,
“^ Stephen S. Anderson, "Soviet Relations with East Europe," 
Current History. October 1966, p. 205.
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. . .  it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe as anything but 
much altered ten years from now and Western Europe as remaining 
essentially the same. Paradoxically, it seems that the cohesion 
of the Communist alliance system, once pressed into a rigid mold, 
will suffer much greater disintegration than the always loose 
noncommunist system.-51
In 1975, ten years after that article appeared, it is difficult to
argue that the Soviet bloc has suffered "much greater disintegration"
than the noncommunist system.
While analyses predicting the dissolution of the Soviet bloc
might have appeared vindicated by the events in Czechoslovakia,
such predictions simply have not been borne out in the years which
have followed. Not only were the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies able to restore stability in Czechoslovakia through an imposed
leadership, but in the past few years they have demonstrated
substantial cohesion and have embarked on a new drive for integration.
Thus while analyses of "polycentrism" may have accurately assessed
the existence of disruptive elements in the bloc, they failed to
account for the ability of the system to contain disruptions and to
build a new form of stability.
To be sure, many analysts found that the events of 1968
confirmed their convictions about the nature of Soviet intentions
and the persistence of bloc power relationships. However, there is
a danger of erring in the opposite direction as well, for the
similarity of Soviet actions in 1956 and 1968 should not obscure
^Herbert Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," 
American Political Science Review 59 (September, 1965):601.
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fundamental changes in the alliance.
Misapprehensions before 1968 concerning Soviet willingness 
to resort to coercion were perhaps’defensible, for all the evidence 
suggests that the decision to invade was made with great reluctance 
on the part of the Soviet leadership. Those analysts who, in the 
mid 1960s, predicted the imminent disintegration of the Soviet bloc, 
however, made a more fundamental error, an error which was often due 
to reliance on false assumptions concerning the nature of integration 
in Eastern Europe. Specifically, faulty conclusions regarding 
East European integration may be seen in terms of three fallacies 
of integration theories: the teleological fallacy, the fallacy of
static analysis, and the fallacy of applying assumptions derived 
from the Western experience.
The teleological fallacy is inherent in many of the defini­
tions of integration. Haas, Etzionl, Deutsch, and others have all 
defined integration in terms of some posited future condition, 
usually political unification, "political community," or a "socialist 
commonwealth of nations."52 Thus many analysts have assessed East 
European integration only to the extent to which interaction among 
the states of Eastern Europe is progressing toward or receding from
S^See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 29;
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965), p. 329; Karl W. Deutsch and others,
Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5; and Leon N.
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963),
p. 6.
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the posited end state. The point to be made is not that there is 
anything inherently wrong with the definitions, but that analyses 
based on such definitions have been inadequate for the assessment 
of the interaction within the Soviet bloc.
There is, for example, a tendency among Western observers 
to view economic integration in the Soviet bloc in terms of efforts 
to create a supranational agency of the kind known in the Common 
Market. Developments of the past few years in the Soviet bloc 
have shown, however, that substantial integrative links, especially 
in terms of import-dependence, have been achieved without the 
implementation of a supranational planning body.
The second source of error is that of static analysis:
©
many observers have assessed integration in the alliance in 
terms of previous goals, objectives, and functions which may no 
longer be relevant. The problem of static analysis is at once the 
most common source of wrong thinking about the Soviet bloc and the 
one most difficult to avoid. If integration is broadly defined in 
terms of alliance function, whether officially acknowledged or not, 
the problem will always remain of redefining what is meant by 
integration. While such a process sacrifices precision and rigor, 
it seems to be an inescapable facet of any valid analysis of the 
Soviet bloc.
The problem of static analysis is at the root of faulty 
conclusions derived from the hypothesis which holds that as inter­
system conflict decreases, intrasystem cohesion decreases. Applying 
the hypothesis to European alliances, several analysts have concluded
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that the reduction of interbloc tension in Europe has contributed to
CO
the disintegration of both blocs. As regards the Soviet bloc, 
such conclusions rest on the assumption that the military threat 
from the West, which may well have been a motive for the initial 
formation of the alliance, continues to be a major factor in alliance 
cohesion.
The basic foundation for this hypothesis is found in the 
work of Simmel concerning group behavior. The essence of Simmers 
proposition is that so long as the basic values of a group remain 
intact, as out-group pressure decreases, in-group cohesion 
decreases.Accepting for the sake of argument the validity of 
Simmelfs proposition, the question becomes, have the basic values 
of the Soviet bloc remained intact? (Clearly, "basic values" 
refers not to Communist ideology, but to "alliance ideology," or 
the goals, objectives, and functions of the alliance.) It seems 
clear that "out-group pressure," defined in terms of military threat, 
has indeed diminished during the past decade, but it seems equally 
clear that the presence or absence of external military threat has 
diminished as a source of cohesion in the Soviet bloc.
53S ee, for example, P. Terrence Hopmann, "The Effects of 
International Conflict and Detente on Cohesion in the Communist 
System," in The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies, ed. 
Roger E. Kanet (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 301-38; and Ole R.
Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and 
Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 88-148.
5^Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1955),
pp. 92-93. [ Emphasis added. ]
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There are, it seems, two possible conclusions to be made from 
the previous discussion. First, it might be argued that external 
conflict, defined in terms of military threat, does not necessarily 
have a profound effect on alliance cohesion. Second, the hypothesis 
might prove to be valid--on the condition that "external threat" is 
redefined to include external economic and ideological threats. Both 
conclusions appear to have been supported by recent developments in 
the Soviet bloc, for with the decrease in military threat from the 
West have come new forms of economic and ideological dangers which 
have required a new emphasis on alliance cohesion.
The third source of error in studies of Communist systems 
results from excessive reliance on assumptions derived from the 
Western experience. At the domestic level, such fallacies are 
revealed in the many "convergence" theories.^5 Simply stated, 
convergence theorists have argued that similarities between socialist 
and Western societies, in terms of industrialization and urbanization, 
for example, will lead ultimately to similarities in the nature of 
political control. While such analyses may illustrate the nature 
of problems faced by the Soviet and East European leaders, predictions 
of convergence simply have not been borne out. In fairness, it should 
be noted that most convergence theorists are well aware of the 
limitations of their analyses. What is intended here is simply to
55por a discussion of the weaknesses of theories of con­
vergence, see Alfred G. Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Change in 
Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 313-41.
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reiterate their own reservations concerning the applicability of the 
Western experience to that of the socialist countries.
The Western experience in alliance behavior has produced 
similar misapprehensions concerning the nature of the alliance system 
in Eastern Europe. Western preoccupation with parliaments, political 
participation, and political development, for example, have led to 
certain expectations and predictions which have not been realized 
with regard to the Soviet bloc. When compared to the Western system 
of alliances in terms of structural sophistication and the existence 
of joint decision-making, the East European alliance is surely 
less well developed. Yet the alliance has, despite its structural 
deficiencies, served well its intended functions, which include the 
formalization of Soviet control in the bloc, the development of bloc 
economies, and the guarantee of a measure of political security 
for the regimes in power.
Excessive reliance on Western standards has led observers 
to two general conclusions. First, many have concluded that the 
Soviet bloc is not integrated or that it is in a process of 
disintegration. The second extreme conclusion, adopted when
behavior has not conformed to expectations, is that the Soviet bloc
is not a "true a l l i a n c e.”^6 The first conclusion is either incorrect 
or irrelevant: incorrect if it refers to the pattern of interaction
in Eastern Europe, and irrelevant if it refers to integration as it
^^Malcolm Mackintosh, ”The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact,” 
Adelphi Papers» no. 58 (London, England: Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1969), p. 18.
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has been understood in other settings. The second conclusion simply 
begs the question.
The preceding discussion has attempted to show some of the 
sources of error in integration theories applied to the Soviet bloc. 
If there is a danger of reaching false conclusions regarding the 
nature of change in the alliance, however, there is also a danger 
of concluding that there has been no change at all. According to 
such a view, it might well be concluded that the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia simply confirmed the permanence of Soviet motives and 
the immutability of the Soviet bloc power relationship. The 
totalitarian literature of the 1950s and the assessments of the 
monolithic quality of the Soviet bloc, for example, implicitly 
precluded the analysis of change. The very terms "totalitarian" 
and "monolithic" made it difficult to acknowledge, much less 
analyze, change in the alliance.
In summary, to be understood at all, the Soviet bloc must 
be understood in terms of its own distinctive functions, structures, 
and relationships. This is not to say that methods of analysis 
which have been applied in other settings must necessarily be 
inappropriate, nor is it to say that integration must be so narrowly 
defined as to apply only to the situation in Eastern Europe. The 
point to be made is that any valid approach must be free of those 
assumptions derived from other analyses which are not relevant to 
the nature of interaction among the states of the East European 
alliance system.
The starting point for analysis of alliance transformation
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must be a definition of integration in terms of the functions it is 
to serve and the structures and relations which have been established 
to perform those functions. From that perspective, it is necessary
to identify the patterns of change and the patterns of continuity
in the alliance, to examine the relationships among them, and to 
indicate the prospects for alliance change in the near future.
Patterns of Change. Patterns of Continuity
As Morton Kaplan has proposed, integrative processes are
processes which join systems or organizations with separate 
institutions and goals within a common framework providing for 
the common pursuit of at least some goals and the common 
implementation of at least some policies.^7
Integration, in this sense, is not a unidirectional process: it
varies with the goals being pursued at a given time.
In order to assess the nature of integration, it is first 
necessary to break down the process into those components which 
perform integrative functions. As part of a conceptual framework 
for the study of the integrative process, Philip E. Jacob has 
suggested ten "integrative factors": geographic proximity,
homogeneity, level of transactions, mutual knowledge, functional 
interest, communal character, structural frame, sovereignty-dependency 
status, governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.
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experience.58 By establishing the relationships among the factors 
which exert an integrative influence, Jacob argues, it is possible 
to assess the progress achieved toward integration.
More important for an analysis of the evolution of the 
Soviet bloc, however, is the assessment of the nature of change in 
each of the factors and possible impact of change in one factor on 
changes in other factors. While all of the 'factors have the 
potential for change, not all of the factors have in fact constituted 
elements of change in the bloc. By assessing the patterns of change 
and the patterns of continuity, however, it is possible to indicate 
the nature of alliance transformation.
The treatment of the ten lfintegrative factors’1 will be 
primarily directed toward the assessment of change in the alliance 
from 1956 to 1968. Since 1968, it will be argued, the patterns of 
change and of continuity had been woven into a new pattern of 
relationships within the Soviet bloc.
Of Jacob’s ten integrative factors, three--mutual knowledge, 
governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative experience--seem 
to be of marginal use in the study of the Soviet bloc. While mutual 
knowledge among the alliance leaders has probably increased, 
particularly in relation to the turbulent years of 1953 to 1956, it. 
would be difficult to argue that any change has had a profound
58philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, ’’The Integrative Process,"
in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob 
and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964),
pp. 1-45.
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impact on the alliance. The other two--governmental effectiveness 
and previous integrative experience--may be treated together. 
Governmental effectiveness refers to the degree to which the 
alliance has met the needs and demands of its members, while 
previous integrative experience refers to the extent to which 
earlier cooperation may contribute to further integration. In both 
cases, the impact has been largely indirect: the evolution of a
pattern of interaction in the Soviet bloc has led to the emergence 
of leaders more or less committed to the existing bloc arrangement. 
In this sense, then, all three of the factors cited constitute 
elements of continuity in the alliance.
The factors of proximity and homogeneity are two additional 
elements of continuity. In terms of geographic proximity, the only 
change in the alliance from 1956 to 1968 was the departure of 
Albania from the system. It need hardly be said that the fact that 
alliance members are contiguous constitutes an important integrative 
factor in the system, particularly in light of the geopolitical 
situation in Europe.
Despite the evidence of "polycentrism” and "domesticism,11 
homogeneity remains the most important integrative factor in the 
alliance. As Leonid Brezhnev has repeatedly observed,
There is every objective condition for the cooperation 
between Socialist countries to grow increasingly stronger.
Our peoples are united by a community of fundamental 
interests. (1) We have an economic foundation of the same 
type--the social ownership of the means of production. (2) We 
have similar state systems--the power of the people, headed by 
the working class. (3) We have a single ideology--Marxism- 
Leninism. (4) We have common interests in insuring security, 
in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples, and in
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defending the revolutionary gains from the encroachments of the 
imperialists. [5] We have a single great a i m - - c o m m u n i s m . - ^
Of course, the existence of similar economic, political, and social
systems is not sufficient to promote integration: it is the
combination--of basic homogeneity, shared interests, and the
existence of a core power committed to the maintenance of its
sphere of influence--which contributes to the persistence of
existing bloc relations.
Patterns of change in the alliance may be seen in terms of 
the other five integrative factors: sovereignty-dependency status,
structural frame, functional interest, transactions, and communal 
character. These five correspond closely to the components Samuel 
Huntington has suggested for the analysis of change in a political
o
system: groups, structure, leadership, policies, and c \ i l t u r e . 6 0
Jacob's sovereignty-dependency factor corresponds to Huntington's 
groups; structural frame corresponds to structure; transactions, to 
policies; and communal character, *to culture.
Not included in Jacob's analysis, however, is the leadership 
component. Clearly, the political leadership in Eastern Europe is in 
a position to influence the direction of change in the alliance. On 
balance, however, the kind of leadership which might have been
59speech in Moscow at the celebration of the 47th anniversary 
of the Bolshevik Revolution, New York Times, November 7, 1964, 
p. 8.
6®Samuel P. Huntington, ''The Change to Change: Modernization,
Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics 3 (April 1971): 
316-17.
59
expected to follow the wave of nationalism in Eastern Europe has not 
emerged. Constrained both by the need to maintain firm party control 
and by Soviet determination to have loyal comrades in positions of 
leadership throughout the bloc,. East European leaders simply 
have not exercised the kind of control envisioned in the totalitarian 
models. Moreover, the kind of influence they have been able to 
■v. exercise has generally served as an element of continuity in the 
alliance. The exceptions--Nagy and Dubcek, whose regimes were 
quickly terminated, and Ceausescu--merely prove the general validity 
of the rule.
The sovereignty-dependency factor taps two dimensions: the
sovereignty of the alliance as a whole and the sovereignty status 
of its component members. In this latter sense, the extent of Soviet 
domination can hardly be exaggerated: Soviet Gross National Product
(GNP) is more than twice that of the other alliance members combined, 
and the Soviet Union continues to play the only significant role in 
bloc military affairs. In terms of national control over the 
instruments of force--a basic criterion of national sovereignty-- 
Soviet influence persists. As Walter Ulbricht has said, "Firm 
friendship with the Soviet Union is the law of life for our people 
and s t a t e . A t  the very least, the power relationships in the 
alliance dictate the limits beyond which any restructuring of the 
alliance may not go.
6^ -Neues Deutschland. October 23, 1968, as cited by Peter 
Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1972), p. 31.
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Nevertheless, important changes have taken place, changes 
which have had an impact on the structure of alliance relationships. 
By 1968 Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were, by virtue of 
their respective GNPs, significant powers in their own rights; and 
East Germany's GNP per capita exceeds that of the Soviet Union.
While the dramatic increase in industrial production in Eastern 
Europe has not resulted directly in increased autonomy, it has been 
reflected indirectly in terms of expanded influence in bloc affairs, 
particularly in bloc trade relations. Moreover, the Soviet need 
for East European finished goods and the signing of long-term trade 
agreements have transformed the previous exploitative arrangement 
into a more interdependent one.
Beyond these objective factors were a number of subjective 
changes reflecting a new sovereignty status in Eastern Europe. The 
de-Stalinization campaign, coupled with growing domestic demands 
following the initial revolutionary fervor, resulted in demands for 
increased autonomy and the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of 
"separate roads to socialism." In the wake of the crises in Hungary 
and Poland in 1956, Khrushchev sought--for the sake of regime 
viability and alliance cohesion--to restructure the alliance on the 
basis of national sovereignty. Even when the propaganda motives 
of the Khrushchev campaign are considered, it is clear that the 
alliance after 1956 was based on a new form of relationships.
The first impact of the change in sovereignty-dependency 
status, then, was reflected in the creation of a new structural
9
frame for the alliance. Though Khrushchev's apparent objective--
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the creation of a supranational agency dominated by the Soviet Union-- 
was never realized, the alliance framework he created served to alter 
the nature of bloc relationships and expand the scope of alliance 
activities. Paradoxically, the same forces which prompted attempts 
toward the creation of a supranational agency eventually served to 
subvert them: that is, the forces of national self-awareness and
assertiveness, which were to be checked by WTO and COMECON, proved 
sufficiently strong to prevent the creation of a supranational 
agency. To repeat a previously cited quotation, the Rumanian 
Worker1s Party responded to the 1962 COMECON integration plan by 
declaring that "the planned management of the national economy is one 
of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the
r O
socialist state."
For any understanding of the interaction among the states 
of Eastern Europe, the "structural framework" of the alliance should 
be conceived in the broadest sense to include, in addition to WTO 
and COMECON, the network of bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
agreements, joint production and planning ventures, and the system 
of meetings and conferences among top party and government leaders.
By 1968 the states of Eastern Europe were linked through the Warsaw 
Pact, COMECON (with its twenty-three permanent commissions), and six
tatement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker's Party 
concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class 
Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among 
Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.
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other major international o r g a n i z a t i o n s .^ 3 Additionally, a series 
of nine bilateral treaties signed in the mid 1960s.served to supple­
ment the Warsaw Pact and to replace the expired treaties of the 
1940s. Thus by 1968 the alliance had progressed from the Stalinist 
system, characterized by a few formal treaties and a pattern of 
direct Soviet influence, to a system in which the East European 
industries were linked through joint production arrangements and 
in which the national military forces were almost totally committed 
to the Warsaw Pact unified command.
Within the new alliance framework, the expanded scope of 
bloc activities was reflected in the increase in intrasystem 
transactions. Some analysts have assessed integration in terms of 
transaction flows, using such indicators as trade data, communication 
flows, and levels of governmental c o n t a c t s . ^4 As Haas has observed, 
however, an increase in transaction levels may either precede, cause, 
reinforce, or result from integration.^ *-* For the purpose of analysis, 
transactions may be seen as a product of integration, though the 
nature of the transactions may stimulate further integration. The 
signing of a trade agreement, for example, may provide for long-term
^Europa Year Book. 1974 (London, England: Europa
Publications, 1974), pp. 102-332.
64See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as 
Indicators of Political Cohesion," in The Integration of Political 
Communities, ed„ Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 188-89.
^Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," 
International Organization 12 (Autumn 1958):445.
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cooperation, and satisfactory cooperative ventures may have a 
“spillover" effect: that is, they may contribute to cooperation-in
other areas of activity.^6
One area of increased interaction among alliance members was 
in the expansion of Warsaw Pact activities from 1956 to 1968. As 
shown in Table 1, the frequency of Warsaw Pact meetings began to 
increase in 1961, the same year that joint military maneuvers began 
to be held on a regular basis. Additionally, the level of represen­
tation increased dramatically: where in 1956 the Political
Consultative Committee (PCC) delegations were headed by the chief 
or deputy chief of Government of the member states, in 1960 the 
delegations were led by the first secretaries of the Communist 
parties, and by 1966 some delegations included (in addition to the 
first secretary) other members of the Politburo, members of the 
chiefs-of-staff, and the ambassador to the Soviet Union.^7
In trade relations, too, the alliance system showed a steady, 
if unspectacular, increase in activity. As illustrated in Table 2, 
the total amount of trade within the system increased three-fold, and 
the percentage of total trade accounted for by intrasystem trade 
remained stable. While the level of transactions reflected in the 
trade data increased substantially, the most profound change was in
66Haas* concept of "spillover" is similar to the doctrine 
of "ramification" developed by David Mitrany in "The Functional 
Approach to World Organization," International Affairs 24 (July 
1948):350-63.
6?Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 165-98.
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WARSAW
TABLE 1 
PACT ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1968
Number of Warsaw Number of
Treaty Organization joint
Year meetings maneuvers
1956 1 • .• •
1957 • ♦ • • • •
1958 1 • • o
1959 1 • • •
1960 1 • • •
1961 3 3
1962 2 5
1963 3 2
1964 • • • 2
1965 5 3
1966 4 2
1967 1 5
1968 7 2
SOURCES :
The Europa Year Book, 1974.
London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1974.
Pp. 410--11.
Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Warsaw
Pact ." International Conciliation, no. 573
(May 1969). Pp. 20-21.
Remington, Robin Alison. The 
Warsaw Pact. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1971. Pp. xvii-xix.
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TABLE 2
COMECON TRADE DATA, 1956 TO 1968 
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Year
Total trade Trade within COMECON
Exports Imports
Percent­
age of 
total 
exports
(%)
1956 8 440 7 800 4 830 57
1957 9 600 9 380 5 940 62
1958 10 110 9 740 6 060 60
1959 11 990 11 690 7 390 62
1960 12 970 12 920 8 080 62
1961 14 120 13 820 8 970 64
19.62 15 770 15 280 10 170 64
1963 17 000 16 380 11 030 65
1964 18 400 18 100 11 960 65
1965 19 710 18 990 12 460 63
1966 20 910 19 670 15 540 60
1967 22 820 21 100 13 740 60
1968 24 900 13 000 15 240 61
SOURCES:
Statistical Yearbook. 1966. New York: United 
Nations, 1967. Table B.
Statistical Yearbook. 1973. New York: United 
Nations, 1974. Table B.
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the nature of the transactions. The increase in coordination, 
specialization, and interdependence is suggested by the expansion 
of COMECON Standing Commissions and agencies. As indicated in Table 3, 
by 1962 twenty-one Standing Commissions had been created to deal 
with problems of coordination in virtually all areas of economic 
activity. Thus by the end of 1962, of 2,500 kinds of industrial 
equipment produced in East Europe, only 300 were produced in more 
than one country.68
As the previous discussion has suggested, the most important 
manifestation of the increased activity through COMECON has been 
not in the level of transactions, but in the qualitatively different 
nature of cooperation. Functional interest, the next of Jacob's 
integrative factors, has not only increased but has become more 
specialized. As the states of Eastern Europe gained power, and as 
they began to face new domestic problems, they came to expect from 
the existing structural framework more specific benefits. Where the 
previous motives for economic cooperation were ostensibly based on 
ideological concerns (often expressed in the desire for a simultan­
eous leap into socialism) , by the mid 1960s economic cooperation 
was based on more explicit economic motivations seen in terms of 
national interest.
A major factor promoting functional cooperation through 
COMECON has been the need for a cooperative arrangement providing
fi O
S. Jendrychowski, "The Economic Effects of the International 
Socialist Division of Labor," World Marxist Review 6 (March 
1963):4.
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TABLE 3
COMECON COMMISSIONS AND AFFILIATED 
AGENCIES, 1956 TO 1968
Field of activity
Year of 
creation
Standing commissions (23)
Coal 1956
Electricity 1956
Oil and gas 1956
Ferrous metallurgy 1956
Nonferrous metallurgy 1956
Chemicals 1956
Machine building 1956
Agriculture 1956
Atomic research 1956
General economic questions 1958
Transportation 1958
Building and construction 1958
Light industry 1958
Atomic energy 1960
Statistics 1962
Coordination of research 1962
Standardization 1962
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TABLE 3--Cbntinued
Field of activity
Year of 
creation
Finance and foreign exchange 1962
Electronics 1962
Geology 1962
Food industry 1962
Water administration 1965
Labor 1968
Agencies (associated committees— 7)
Post, telegraph and telephone (communications) 1957
Druzba pipeline (gas and oil) 1962
Mir powerline (electricity) 1962
Intermetall (ferrous metallurgy) 1964
Ball bearings (machine building) 1964
International bank (finance) 1964
Shipping and freight (transportation) 1965
SOURCES:
The Europa Year Book, 1974. London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974. Pp. 186-87.
Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in 
Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974.
Pp. 8-16.
Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Evolution of COMECON." In 
International Political Communities: An Anthology. Edited by Anchor
Books. Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966. Pp. 367-88.
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protection from the economic giants of Western Europe. Moreover, 
it has come to be recognized in Eastern Europe that in order to 
reach a stage of economic viability, economic cooperation must be 
conducted, not on the basis envisioned in the 1962 COMECON Basic 
Principles plan, but on the basis of state equality and functional 
specialization.
In the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well, substantial, 
if less easily discernible, changes in functional interest took 
place. To be sure, two important functions of the organization 
have persisted: namely, its function as an extension of the Soviet
defense command and its function as an instrument of Soviet influence 
in Eastern Europe. With the gradual reduction of the military 
threat from the West during the 1960s, however, the WTO began to 
serve a less purely military function. As has been seen, the 
nature of the threat from the West is no longer seen in purely 
military terms, but in terms of the threat to political security 
posed by the expansion of East-West contacts.
The expansion of WTO's political functions has been seen in 
the increased emphasis on the Political Consultative Committee. Not 
only has the nature of representation at the PCC demonstrated its 
new importance, but the Committee has dealt with problems of an 
increasingly political nature. As several analysts have concluded, 
during the 1960s the functions of the Warsaw Pact came to include the 
recognition and accommodation of divergent interests, and the 
organization began to be used as an agency for conflict resolution
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in the alliance.^9
In summary, the change in sovereignty-dependency status of 
the states of Eastern Europe necessitated the creation of a more 
flexible and sophisticated alliance structure, and emerging demands 
in Eastern Europe led to new forms of transactions and new functional 
interests. Moreover, the patterns of change in the alliance have 
led to the evolution of a new communal character, Jacob*s final 
integrative factor.
In 1956 the East European alliance system was characterized 
by a communal character, or alliance ideology, which included a 
number of ambitious, often utopian, goals. In the broadest sense, 
the alliance reflected a commitment to the establishment of 
Marxism-Leninism on an international scale. In terms of military 
security, it was committed to the.defense of socialism against the 
forces of Western imperialism. Economic coordination, seen primarily 
in ideological terms, was aimed at preparing the states of East 
Europe for the simultaneous leap into socialism with the eventual 
aim of building "the socialist world economy into a single entity.
During the following decade, however, a number of external 
and internal developments had served to alter the character of the 
alliance. The problems which followed the revolutionary social
^See, for example, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: 
Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1967), pp. 456-512; and Remington, The Warsaw Pact» pp. 165-98.
70Nikita S. Khrushchev, ''Vital Questions of the Development 
of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September 
1962):9.
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upheavals in Eastern Europe, heightened by the denunciation of Stalin, 
diminished the importance of ideology as a cohesive element in the 
alliance. Additionally, the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on 
existing polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe tended to subvert 
the grandiose aims of the alliance as it was originally conceived. 
Finally, the rapid decline in East-West hostilities served to erode 
the original basis of the military arm of the alliance.
As previous threats subsided, however, new ones emerged.
The expansion of East-West trade and the increase in human contacts 
presented a potential threat to the regime security of the states 
of Eastern Europe, and economic problems in the face of growing 
consumer demands presented a threat to economic viability and 
political security. New problems created new motives for integration-- 
integration based, however, on a new communal character.
Thus by 1968 considerations of military security had given 
way to concern for regime security as a cementing element in the 
alliance, and ideological aspirations had been, for all intents 
and purposes, set aside. The grandiose objectives of economic 
coordination had been abandoned in favor of limited functional 
cooperation and specialization based on economic motives and 
national priorities. Moreover, the very essence of interstate 
relations had been altered to accommodate divergent views and 
interests. Thus by 1969, an official document from the International 
Conference of Communist and Workers1 Parties could assert,
All parties have equal rights. At this time when there 
is no leading center of the international communist movement, 
voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order
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effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased 
importance.71
71»»Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference 
of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," Pravda. 
June 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press 21 (August 1969):24.
CHAPTER III
"SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM" IN THE 1970S
The elements of change and of continuity which evolved during 
the 1960s had by the end of that decade been woven into a distinctively 
new pattern of interstate relations in Eastern Europe. In theoretical 
literature, the new pattern has been linked to "socialist inter­
nationalism" and "international relations of a new type," terms 
which date from the early years of the Khrushchev era.^2 Since 
1970, however, the terms have received increased attention, and the 
new form of interstate relations has been the subject of considerable
7 0
ideological interpretation and justification.'J The following excerpt 
from an article in the Moscow journal International Affairs is 
representative of a consistent theme in the Soviet press.
Proletarian internationalism constitutes a basic principle 
of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and of the policies of the 
communist parties. . . . I n  the course of creating and
72see, for example, G. I. Tunkin, "Socialist Internationalism 
and International Law," New Times [ Moscow ], October/December, 1957> 
p. 10.
73For a development of the terms in relation to Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine, see Jan F. Triska, "The Socialist World System 
in Search of a Theory," in The New Communisms, ed. Dan N. Jacobs 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 18-46; Nish
Jamgotch, Jr., "Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type 
of International Relations)," World Politics 27 (April, 1975):405-29; 
and Nish Jamgotch, Jr., Soviet--East European Dialogue:
International Relations of a New Type? (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 89-104.
73
74
consolidating the multinational Soviet state, building socialism 
and communism in the USSR and in the process of socialist con­
struction in the fraternal countries, for the first time it 
became the foundation for the development of inter-state relations 
of a new, socialist type. Under socialism, the social base of 
proletarian internationalism has immeasurably been extended, and 
now has become the state policy of socialist countries. . . .
Thus, socialist internationalism has become the chief principle 
of relations among the fraternal countries.74
Like proletarian internationalism, of course, socialist 
internationalism is held to be a transitional stage toward the 
achievement of Communism on an international scale, justified as being 
"the most acceptable and objectively inevitable form of combining 
national and international interests, of materially preparing for their 
fusion in [ the ] f u t u r e . "75 During this transitional stage, it is 
argued,
despite the coincidence of basic interests, different 
approaches to some questions are not ruled out. . . . Under 
socialism, however, unlike the basic contradictions inherent 
in capitalist society, they are not antagonistic. °
Like Khrushchev*s 1956 reference to the ''commonwealth of 
socialist nations" based on "full equality" and s o v e r e i g n t y , 77 
socialist internationalism represents a distinct departure from the
74b . Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion,"
International Affairs [ Moscow ], March 1974, p. 5. [ Emphasis added. ]
75b . Ladygin, "Socialist Internationalism: Fraternity and
Cooperation," International Affairs [ Moscow ], June 1973, p. 10.
76Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion," p. 7.
77MDeclaration by the Soviet Government on 'Principles of 
Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation 
Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States,1 October 30,
1956," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H.
McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co.,
1967), p. 92.
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past. Not only does it represent a further acknowledgment that the 
"fraternal countries" may justifiably exercise independence in inter­
state relations, but it suggests that the transitional stage may 
be prolonged and will be characterized by "nonantagonistic" contra­
dictions. When taken in context, moreover, references to socialist
internationalism clearly imply a limiting of the term to apply to
- 78the East European "core" of the socialist system.
The rhetoric of socialist internationalism should not, of 
course, obscure the reality of current alliance relations. If by 
"commonwealth of socialist nations" is meant an association of free 
and equal states, it is clear that no such arrangement exists. 
Nevertheless, fundamental changes have taken place within the 
alliance. If the Soviet bloc is conceived in terms of a continuum 
running from Stalinist cohesion to a socialist commonwealth, for 
example, it is clear that the alliance has moved a long way from the 
completely Soviet-controlled system of the early 1950s.
In practical terms, the new form of interstate relations has 
been manifested in both internal and external policy. Internally, 
alliance relations have become increasingly charaterized by unity 
through accommodation of pluralistic tendencies, moderated of course 
by Soviet predominance*. Specifically, the alliance has been character­
ized by increased efforts toward functional economic cooperation, by 
an expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization,
7^For an assessment of Eastern Europe as the "core" of the 
socialist system, see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue: 
International Relations of a New Type?, pp. 29-33.
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and by a campaign to restore ideological unity. Externally, socialist 
internationalism has been reflected in new forms of relations with 
the West, conducted through intensified coordination of bloc foreign 
policies.
There have been instructive parallels between domestic
Soviet policy and the emerging form of alliance relations. In 1971
the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party announced
a ,fpeace program" abroad and an "ideological war" domestically,
reflecting a desire to derive specific benefits through cooperation
79with the West while maintaining firm domestic control. Similarly, 
the new form of alliance relations has been characterized by growing 
cooperation with the West and by increased concern for tight alliance 
management.
The linkage between external developments and internal 
alliance relations has been the fundamental feature of socialist 
internationalism. While the reduction of East-West tension and the 
expansion of trade relations between East and West during the 1960s 
presented the states of Eastern Europe with the opportunity for 
importing much-needed technological assistance, the new form of 
relations with the West threatened to introduce disruptive tendencies 
into the alliance.
With the failure of the 1962 Basic Principles plan for COMECON
79Report to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Pravda, March 31, 
1971, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 
23, April 12, 1971, pp. 3-13; May 4, 1971, pp. 1-12.
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integration, Eastern Europe began to turn increasingly to Western 
markets. While trade among COMECON members doubled from 1962 to 1972, 
trade with Western Europe during the same period quadrupled, and
on
trade with the United States and Japan increased eight-fold.OKJ While 
the total volume of trade with the West amounted to less than one- 
third of COMECON trade even by 1972, the bilateral nature of the 
exchanges and the rapid expansion of trade relations threatened to 
upset the nature of COMECON trade and, ultimately, of East European 
integration. Thus by the late 1960s the need became apparent for a 
coordinated approach to the West on the one hand and a new basis for 
East European integration on the other.
By 1966 the East European alliance had already formulated, 
in general terms, a plan for a European conference on security and 
cooperation. Following a meeting in Bucharest in 1966, the WTO 
Political Consultative Committee issued a proposal for the recognition 
of existing European boundaries, the creation of a new security 
system in Europe, the exclusion of West Germany from access to 
nuclear weapons, and the promotion of economic, scientific and techni- 
cal cooperation between East and West. The problem which remained, 
however, was to build a tight, integrated socialist community in an 
era of East-West detente and expanded contacts between East and West.
^Statistical Yearbook. 1973 (New York: United Nations,
1974), Table B.
SlPravda, March 18, 1966, as translated in The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press 18 , July 27, 1966 , pp..3-7.
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Alliance Management in the 1970s
The process of change in alliance relationships was accelerated 
by two developments: the exchange of diplomatic recognition between
Rumania and West Germany in 1967 and the crisis and subsequent 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Rumanian action under­
scored both the altered nature of interbloc relations in Europe and 
the potential problems of independent East European policies toward 
the West. The crisis in Czechoslovakia and its difficult resolution 
revealed both the inadequacy of bloc consultative arrangements and 
the need for creating long-term economic ties among the states of 
Eastern Europe. Additionally, the manifestation of pervasive anti- 
Soviet sentiment may have convinced the Soviet leadership to attempt 
to weld .a .more genuine form of ideological unity in the alliance.
During 1968 and 1969 a number of official pronouncements set 
the stage for coming alliance developments, developments which seemed 
to bear out the promise of "international relations of a new type.11 
Not only did these pronouncements reflect new alliance functions and 
purposes, but they reflected a new pattern of interstate relations in 
the alliance system.
In June of 1969, for example, a communique from the 
International Conference of Communist and Workers1 Parties asserted,
All parties have equal rights. At this time when there is 
no leading center of the international communist movement, 
voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order 
effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased
79
importance
Even when allowance is made for the rhetorical aspects of the Conference 
statement, the departure from past communiques is apparent. Moreover, 
developments since 1969 have affirmed the "increased importance" 
which has been attached to "voluntary coordination" among communist 
parties on ideological topics.
The second official pronouncement was the well-known Brezhnev 
Doctrine. The ideological justification for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, delivered in September of 1968, asserted that "the 
weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct 
effect on all the socialist countries." Arguing that the socialist 
states had an "internationalist duty" to defend socialism, the 
pronouncement went on to justify the "actions taken in Czechoslovakia 
by the five allied socialist countries" as "actions aimed at defending 
the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth."^ At 
first glance, the Brezhnev Doctrine did little more than officially 
affirm the long-standing Soviet determination to preserve its sphere 
of influence in Eastern Europe. The fact that this determination 
was justified at such length, however, signalled a basic shift in 
the function of the Warsaw Pact, which includes no provision for
82>'Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference 
of Communists and Workers1 Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," Pravda. 
June 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press 21, August 6, 1969,;p..24.
^"Sovereignty and International Obligations of Socialist 
Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968, as translated in The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press 20, October 16, 1968, pp. 10-12.
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concerted action against a Pact member. Thus, following 1968, the
Warsaw Pact functions had been officially broadened to include, in
addition to defense against external attack, the defense of socialism
from both internal and external enemies.
The third official pronouncement was significant not for what
it did say, but for what it did not say. In the months preceding the
April, 1969, special COMECON session, it was widely feared in Eastern
Europe that the Soviet Union would attempt to create a supranational
agency of the kind envisioned in 1962.^4 The communiquef which
followed the summit, however, called for improved cooperation,
coordination, and specialization by any "interested countries
85according to necessity." No reference was made to a supranational 
agency, and the word "integration" was not mentioned. In fact, a 
month earlier the Soviet representative to COMECON, Mikhail Lesechko, 
had argued that the implementation of any cooperative measures 
"wholly depends on the wishes of interested Comecon countries and must 
be founded on their voluntary participation."^ The theme of voluntary
'* o
participation was to be the foundation of the COMECON integration 
program announced two years later.
O A
OHFor. an excellent summary of statements in the East European 
press, see Henry W. Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 3-48.
85" C o m m u n i q u e  on the Twenty-third Special Comecon Session," 
Pravda, April 27, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press 21, May 14, 1969, p. 9.
^Cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration,
p. 43.
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The Comprehensive Program of Integration
A West German economist, using the analogy of a ship, has 
assessed the problems of East European economic integration in this 
way:
Neither the helmsman nor several of the crew of the East 
European boat are willing to unleash this economic integration from 
within. Or in terms of the metaphor, they are unwilling to coordi­
nate the various activities and duties of the crew because none 
of its members has sufficient authority and power to do so, and 
the abilities of the captain are doubted and distrusted. 
Consequently, the ship moves back and forth and ahead by the 
sheer force of the wind (e.g. the demand for manufactured goods 
by the USSR from Eastern Europe) and by the resultant of the 
various forces exerted by the members of the crew. Frustrating 
attempts to create the conditions for integration from without . . 
are being introduced. . .
Clearly, economic integration through the use of a supranational 
agency would be more in keeping with the modus operandi of the Soviet 
Union. As the experience of 1962 had shown, however, attempts to 
create and promote integration "from within" arouse strong opposition 
in Eastern Europe. From 1969 to 1971, COMECON sessions and interparty 
meetings were devoted to the problem of approaching integration "from 
without" through the gradual processes of specialization and coopera­
tion.
Attempts toward COMECON integration remained intimately tied 
to the emerging bloc policy toward pan-European security and coopera­
tion. Meeting in Budapest in 1969, the Warsaw Pact members repeated
87jc>zef M. P. van Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and 
Integration in Eastern Europe (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press,
1974), p. 22.
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the call for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.®**
Thus between 1969 and 1971 there began to emerge a complex strategy 
of coordinating bloc policies toward the West, while at the same 
time promoting basic integration of key industries in Eastern Europe.
It is evident that the debate over the future of COMECON inte­
gration was marked by sharp differences of opinion and that the program 
ultimately announced reflected a compromise solution. An article in 
the Hungarian press concerning the November, 1970, meeting of COMECON*s 
Permanent Economic Committee reported fundamental differences, "espe­
cially concerning the estimation of the relationship between, and 
importance of, plan and market,1* and noted that "debate was particularly 
trenchant on the question of [ currency ] convertibility."®^
Despite the conflict over particular aspects of COMECON 
integration, the general consensus among East European leaders was 
that coordination of bloc policies toward the West was vital to all 
their interests and that improved COMECON relations--so long as they 
did not involve the creation of a supranational agency--were necessary 
for economic d e v e l o p m e n t . ^  Maintaining its maverick role, Rumania 
consistently opposed. COMECON integration, rejecting what an article 
in the Rumanian press called "proposals of an integrationist nature
Pravda, March 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press 21, April 2, 1969,:pp. 11-12.
®^Report on the conference by K. Apatini in Penzugyi Szemle, 
January, 1971, as cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of 
Integration, p. 143.
90For an assessment of attitudes as expressed in the East 
European press, see ibid., pp. 61-158.
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bordering on transgression of the independence of the socialist states, 
their sovereignty, their right to decide independently about their 
entire economic activity."91
During 1971, however, Rumania was increasingly forced into a 
position of isolation which it could not maintain. At the Twenty-fourth 
COMECON Executive Council, an International Investment Bank (IIB)
(see Table 4) had been created to supplement the activities of the 
International Bank of Economic Cooperation. Rumania initially 
abstained from joining IIB, apparently because the bank*s procedures 
provided for a three-fourths majority vote on some issues, rather 
than the rule of unanimity which had been followed in all previous 
COMECON ventures. The case of the IIB quickly exposed the limits of 
Rumanian independence. Unwilling to deny itself the use of much- 
needed investment funds and afraid of finding itself unable to 
exercise any influence on decisions of potential importance for all 
of Eastern Europe, Rumania reluctantly joined the Investment Bank.
Rumania, which had almost single-handedly subverted the 1962 
COMECON integration plan, found itself utterly unable to resist the 
forces of integration in 1970. Threatened with the withdrawal of 
Soviet oil supplies, Rumanian President Ceausescu signed a five year 
Soviet-Rumanian protocol on coordination of national economic plans 
in return for a Soviet pledge.to increase oil deliveries. Rumania*s 
reluctant endorsement of COMECON programs, demonstrated again in
9^1. Radulescu,. Probleme Economice. April 1971, as cited by 
Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, p'. 112.
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TABLE 4
COMECON COMMITTEES, CONFERENCES AND 
AGENCIES CREATED SINCE 1968
Organization
Year of 
creation
Committees
Interstate Commission on Calculating Techniques 1969
Committee on Economic Problems 1970
Committee for Cooperation and Planning 1971
Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation 1971
Committee for Scientific and Technical Information 1971
* Conferences
Conference on Legal Affairs 1970
Conference on Technological Inventions and Patents 1971
Ministers of Home Trade 1971
Agencies (associated committees)
Interchim (Petro-chemical industry)
International Investment Bank (currency and finance) 
Interatominst (atomic energy)
1969
1971
1972
85
SOURCES:
The Europa Year Book, 1974. London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974. Pp. 186-87.
Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in 
Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974. Pp. 8-16.
Rumania*s decision to join Interchim and Intermetall, removed the
92final obstacle to the new integration program.
Although Rumania succumbed to strong Soviet pressure in 1970 
and 1971, it should be noted that Rumania was able to extract signifi­
cant concessions from its larger neighbor. The very fact that the 
Soviet Union felt constrained to increase oil deliveries in return 
for Rumanian cooperation reflected the existence of "international 
relations of a new type."
Concessions and compromise also marked the Comprehensive 
Program of Socialist Integration signed in August of 1971 (see
t
Table 5). The reference in Section 2 to the problems of the less 
developed East European members stands in marked contrast to the 
Basic Principles plan of 1962, which would have relegated them to the 
status of suppliers of raw materials. The same theme was developed 
in a recent article in the Soviet press. Arguing that "the existing 
differences in development levels retards the deepening of the 
international socialist division of labour and the process of 
integration," the article noted that "the maximum gap in the per
9^For a discussion of Soviet-Rumanian relations during 1970 
and 1971, see Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, 
pp. 98-113.
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TABLE 5
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM 
OF INTEGRATION
Section
1. Introduction
2. Leveling
3.
through 9.
Consultation,
Planning,
Cooperation
The purpose of the Program is "the grad­
ual . . . equalization of the members1 
economic development levels, and the 
formation of profound and stable ties 
in the fundamental sectors of the econ­
omy ’Integration," it is emphasized,
"is taking place on the basis of 
complete voluntaryism; it is not 
accompanied by the creation of supra­
national organs."
Less developed members are promised 
"preferential conditions for coopera­
tion."
The nature of cooperation is to be 
decided upon by all interested coun­
tries , and integration is to be a pro­
cess "regulated in a deliberate and 
planned manner." Financial reform is 
to be negotiated according to a planned
TABLE 5— Continued
Section
10.
through 14.
Cooperation in 
Specific Spheres
15.
through 17.
Legal and
Organizational
Questions
schedule. Direct bilateral ties and 
joint production ventures are per­
mitted, but joint organizations "will 
not be supranational in nature, or 
touch on internal planning questions."
Specific timetables are drawn up for 
cooperation and specialization in 
industry, agriculture, transportation, 
construction, and water resources 
utilization.
The legal basis of cooperation is to be 
improved "by bringing closer together 
the corresponding national legal norms 
and also through their unification by 
the interested countries." Provisions 
are made for multilateral decisions on 
the legal regulation of joint organiza­
tions and for the creation of new 
organizations by interested states. 
"Every COMECON country has the right to 
state at any moment its interest in 
participating in a measure of the
TABLE 5— Continued
88
Section
*
comprehensive program in which it has 
previously refused to participate for 
one reason or another." Participation, 
it is repeated, is to be on a 
"completely voluntary" basis.
SOURCE: "Complex Integration Program," Pravda, August 7,
1971, as cited by Henry W. Schaefer, COMECON and the Politics of 
Integration. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 159-72.
[ Emphasis added. ]
capita production of national income between the CMEA countries from 
1950 to 1970 declined from 3.1:1 to 1.9:1."^ The new emphasis on 
"leveling" appears to be a concession and an inducement to the less 
developed COMECON members, particularly to Rumania.
The emphasis in the Comprehensive Program is entirely on volun­
tary cooperation among interested countries: supranational planning
is explicitly ruled out. Aside from the emphasis on voluntary par­
ticipation, the most striking feature of the Comprehensive Program 
is the limited nature of its objectives. It has been frequently 
repeated in the Soviet press that integration must be a gradual and 
deliberate process.
9^A. Shabalin, "The Comprehensive Programme of Integration," 
International Affairs [ Moscow ], April 1975, pp. 18-19.
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The vagueness of Sections Three through Fourteen has led one
analyst to conclude that *'the concept of socialist integration, as it
appears in the [ Comprehensive Program ], leaves much to be desired:
94
it clearly amounts to a very long-term aim, if even that. Such
a conclusion is justified only if one defines integration in terms 
of unification through a supranational agency. The objective in 1971 
was clearly more limited. Aside from the purely economic objectives 
of improved cooperation, the principal aim of the Soviet Union, and 
to varying degrees of its East European allies, was to construct ties 
so complex that no member could extricate itself from the alliance 
without suffering economic catastrophe.
It should also be noted that the Comprehensive Program was 
superimposed on an already complex network of organizations and trade 
agreements. More importantly, the Comprehensive Program represented 
the first serious effort to deal with a number of problems of East 
European economic integration: investment funding, pricing, currency
convertibility, and central planning through coordination of national 
plans.
Central planning had, of course, been tried on previous 
occasions. As indicated in Table 4, however, the 1971 plan created 
three new commissions to deal with planning and. coordination, and by 
1974 several COMECON members had for the first time included in their
9^an Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration 
in Eastern Europe, p. 109.
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national economic plans sections dealing with i n t e g r a t i o n . ^  On 
balance, it appears that the improved coordination of national plans 
is the best compromise between two extreme alternatives: planning
through a supranational agency and reliance on market forces.
A number of problems, it should be noted, were simply tabled 
for further discussion. Agreement of the use of the transferable ruble 
as international currency, for example, was to follow prolonged dis­
cussion during the 1970s, with a final decision to be made no earlier 
than 1980. Specialization and coordination of scientific research, 
to be conducted through some 1,600 research institutes,96 is also 
likely to be a long process.
The chief virtue of the Comprehensive Program was that it 
improved the general framework for cooperation. The provision for 
voluntary participation, for example, means that a veto by one 
member can no longer prevent activity. Additionally, Sections Ten 
through Fourteen established detailed programs for joint planning and 
cooperation in key industries and in agriculture. By 1975 it was 
already apparent that coordination of national plans and cooperation 
through COMECON agencies had increased significantly the import- 
dependence of COMECON members.97
The implementation of the Comprehensive Program, however, has 
not been an entirely smooth process. Since 1971, the Soviet Union 
has used its near monopoly on bloc raw materials as a means of assuring
95shabalin, ’’The Comprehensive Programme of Integration," p. 15. 
96ibid., p. 16.
9?Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, 
pp. 170-94; and van Brabant, Essays on Planning. Trade and Integration 
in Eastern Europe, pp. 270-93.
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cooperation from reluctant allies. Earlier this year it was announced 
that Soviet oil prices would no longer be based on previously agreed 
rates, but would fluctuate with the world market. The impact of the 
Soviet decision on Eastern Europe has been profound. Referring to 
balance of payments problems resulting from increased oil prices, 
Hungary1 s Janos Radar recently spoke of the need for ’’much better 
utilization than previously of the great opportunities inherent in 
the economic cooperation of the socialist countries.
The most interesting case has been that of Rumania, where 
Soviet influence has been more direct. Soviet-Rumanian trade, which 
has increased by 40 percent in the last five years, was expanded 
another 10 percent by the Soviet-Rumanian trade protocol of 1975.
The 1975 protocol, which followed negotiations over the continuance 
of Soviet oil deliveries, was accompanied by five-year'agreements 
on Soviet-Rumanian technical cooperation.^9 Thus while Rumanian 
President Ceausescu has continued to assert that "attempts are 
sometimes made to deny and underestimate the historic role of the 
nation in the present stage of building socialism,”100 he has been 
forced to increase systematically Rumania’s economic dependence on
98cited by Dusko Doder, "Hungary Reports Economic Setbacks," 
Washington Post. March 18, 1975.
^ R u m a n i a n  Situation Report/l, Radio Free Europe Research. 
January 10, 1975, p. 4; and Rumanian Situation Report/5, Radio Free 
Europe Research, February 5, 1975, pp. 3-4.
l^^Ceausescu1s speech of March 28, 1975, as quoted in 
Rumanian Situation Report/14, Radio Free Europe Research. April 17, 
1975, p. 3.
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the Soviet Union.
The existence of Soviet pressure should not, however, obscure 
the fundamental consensus of views in Eastern Europe. It is widely 
believed among East European leaders that economic stability, 
particularly in the period of expanded East-West trade relations, 
demands close cooperation among the states of Eastern Europe and tight 
coordination of bloc foreign policies. At a more basic level, it is 
believed that political security in Eastern Europe demands a strong 
and unified alliance.
The Changing Role of the Warsaw Pact
Writing in 1969, one analyst, referring to the decline in 
East-West hostilities, concluded that "once both sides had realized 
that the threats were largely imaginary, [NATO and the Warsaw Pact ] 
lost their raison d 1 litre. "101 Since that writing, the military threat 
faced by the Warsaw Pact countries has continued to diminish. In 
the Moscow-Bonn agreement of 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany 
agreed to "respect unreservedly the territorial integrity of all 
states in Europe in their present frontiers."102 Moscow-Bonn
Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the treaties signed 
between West Germany and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have 
served to formalize the status quo in central Europe. As one Soviet
lOlAndrzej Kobonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International 
Conciliation, no. 573 (May 1969), p. 73.
102soviet--West German Treaty, as translated from the West 
German Press in Current History, October 1970, p. 238.
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spokesman recently observed,
The situation in Europe has changed considerably in the past 
few years. . . . Whereas back in the 1960's we Communists* 
correctly brought to the forefront the task of consolidating the 
territorial and political results of World War II, now we have 
every reason to say that the major successes in accomplishing 
this task are indisputable.103
Thus by 1972 the threats which the Warsaw Pact had been formed 
to counter had gradually dissolved. The conclusion that the Pact 
has lost its raison d'etre, however, is wrong on two counts. In a 
purely military sense, the WTO continues to serve to maintain the 
European power balance, and a strong WTO remains vital to the 
negotiating position of the Eastern bloc in relations with the West. 
More importantly, the WTO's role in bloc affairs has been altered to 
meet a new type of threat. As one analyst has argued,
The absence of danger can itself become a danger--a paradox 
that sometimes has very concrete consequences. Detente and 
cooperation do indeed reduce the possibility of a military con­
flict, but they increase the possibilities of ideological 
"infection."104
The possibility of ideological infection, in turn, increases the threat 
to the preservation of political power and authority in Eastern Europe.
Of course, the Warsaw Pact has always represented a good deal 
more than simply an integrated military defense command. It is not 
going too far to say that never before have a group of rulers depended
lO^Speech by Ponomarev at the meeting of European
Communist and Workers' Parties, Pravda, October 18, 1974, as translated 
in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 26, November 13, 1974, 
p. 3.
104peter Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 7.
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so much on an international alliance system for their continued legiti­
macy. The difficulties of applying revolutionary doctrine on a broad 
scale, as well as the international requirements of Marxism, have 
served to imbue the Warsaw Pact with an "internationalist duty” 
which far exceeds pure military objectives. As the Brezhnev Doctrine 
has made clear, the "internationalist duty" of the socialist states 
includes the defense of socialism from internal, as well as external, 
enemies.
All the evidence suggests an expansion, rather than a 
contraction, of Warsaw Pact activities since 1968. In 1969 alone, the 
Warsaw Pact held six conferences and conducted six joint military 
exercises. Additionally, the reorganization of the joint armed 
forces, announced by the March, 1969, Political Consultative 
Committee, provided for the creation of three new WTO organs: the
Military Council, the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces, 
and the Committee of Defense Ministers. Although the nature of the 
reorganization plan has never been made public, assessments by East 
European leaders, including Rumania's Ceausescu, suggest that the
new structure permits greater participation in WTO by the East
i t  106 European allies.
As has been the case in COMECON, Rumania's policies toward the
^~*The Europa Yearbook, 1974 (London, England: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974), p. 409.
106
For an assessment and a summary of East European press 
reports, see Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 114-33.
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Warsaw Pact provide a yardstick for the assessment of the emergence 
of new bloc relations. Although he endorsed the reorganization plan, 
Rumanian President Ceausescu made it clear that he felt defense 
against external aggression to be "the only plausible reason for the 
existence of [ the Warsaw Pact ]."^^ Since 1969, however, the 
Soviet Union apparently has endeavored to elicit Rumanians cooperation 
in Warsaw Pact activities by granting Rumania a greater decision­
making role. Following the 1969 Moscow summit, for example, the 
Rumanian press commented that now each country could "make a contri­
bution of major importance" in bloc affairs.
As a result of continuing Soviet pressure, Rumania has 
expanded greatly its participation in Warsaw Pact activities since 
1969. Following extensive consultation throughout 1970, Rumania and 
the Soviet Union signed the long-awaited Soviet-Rumanian Friendship 
Treaty, agreeing "unswervingly to observe the commitments envisaged 
in the Warsaw Treaty.*’109 The expansion of Rumania1 s role in the 
Warsaw Pact was capped in 1973, when for the first time since 1962 
joint WTO exercises were held in Rumanian territory.
By 1970, the new role of the Warsaw Pact had become more
IQ^Scinteia, April 11, 1969, as cited by Remington, The 
Warsaw Pact, p. 130.
108scinteia. December 7, 1969, as cited by Remington, The 
Warsaw Pact, p, 125.
109"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Between 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of 
Rumania," Pravda. July 8, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press 22, August 11, 1970, p. 8.
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apparent. With NATO*s tentative acceptance of the Warsaw Pact propo­
sal for a European security conference and the signing of the 
Moscow-Bonn agreement, attention in Eastern Europe was turned to the 
problems inherent in the rapid expansion of contacts with the West. 
Specifically, the reorientation of WTO activities has been reflected 
in the increased concern over the ideological danger from the West 
and in the expanded use of the PCC as a means of coordinating bloc 
foreign policies.
The August, 1970, PCC meeting was attended by delegations 
which included all Party First Secretaries, as well as various 
Politburo members, representatives of the chiefs-of-staffs, East 
European ambassadors to the Soviet Union, and central committee 
secretaries in charge of interparty relations. u The increased 
emphasis on the PCC has been paralleled by regular meetings of the 
newly-formed Military Council and Committee of Defense Ministers. The 
importance of the WTO was emphasized by Leonid Brezhnev in his address 
to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress: "The Warsaw Pact has been, and
remains, the main center for coordinating the fraternal countries* 
foreign policy.
The December, 1970, meeting of the PCC--the second in five 
months--reflected the difficulties of establishing a unified bloc 
policy toward the West. The conference communique" was a study in 
compromise. The emphasis on "sovereignty, . . , equality and
"^Remington, The Warsaw Pact, pp. 188-89. 
mCited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 165.
noninterference” was obviously a concession to Rumanian concerns. 
Additionally, explicit references were made to the*concerns of 
Czechoslovakia, and "the conference unanimously expressed solidarity 
with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic.
Beyond these surface difficulties, however, were the more profound 
problems associated with detente.
With the rapid improvement of Soviet-American relations and 
the West German Ostpolitik of 1970-1972, the threat from the 
hashington-Bonn axis" became increasingly difficult to invoke as a 
rallying cry in Eastern Europe. Not only did the decline of East-West 
tension diminish the objective need for bloc unity, but the rapid 
expansion of contacts with the West increased the less tangible threat 
of ideological "softening up.1* Thus the process of detente poses a 
twofold threat in Eastern Europe: on the one hand, it threatens to
undermine the socialist unity on which the stability of the East 
European regimes rests; and on the other, it threatens to introduce 
liberalizing elements into East European societies.
The threat of ideological "infection11 has been felt most 
keenly in East Germany. Since ideology has always been the principal 
justification for the existence of a separate German state, East 
Germany has attached great importance to the policy of abgrenzung. the 
sharpening of the ideological struggle. As a recent East German
■^ -•^ "Statement on Questions of the Strengthening of Security 
and the Development of Peaceful Cooperation in Europe," Pravda, 
December 4, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press 22, January 5, 1971, p. 2.
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Communist party resolution warned, "In view of the mass contacts of 
human beings of opposite ideologies and ways of living, the greatest
i 1 O
degree of class awareness and activity are mandatory. It is
transparently obvious, however, that the real threat perceived in East 
Germany is not to Communist ideology but to the political security of 
the existing regime. Despite the economic expansion enjoyed in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), the attraction of Western standards 
of living, it is feared, will raise new expectations and new demands 
within East German society.
Similar fears have been voiced in Czechoslovakia. The 
Czechoslovak leadership, faced with the task of political consolida­
tion in the wake of the Prague Spring, has endorsed the East German 
call for the sharpening of the ideological struggle. A recent article 
Rude Pravo, for example, warned,
Bourgeois politicians and ideologists who decide to attain old 
anticommunist goals by new "peaceful" means rely on the develop­
ment of commercial and other contacts between capitalist and 
socialist countries to revive inside socialism the influence of 
ideas completely alien to socialism.
For the East European leaderships, the solution to the 
problems inherent in expanded East-West relations has been a revival 
of domestic conservatism and political repression. With the exception
^■^Cited by John Dornberg, l!East Germany: The Special Case,"
in East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, 
ed. Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974), p. 116.
114cited by Robert W. Dean, "Foreign Policy Perspectives and 
European Security: Poland and Czechoslovakia," in East European
Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed. Robert R. King 
and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 161.
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of Hungary, which continues to have the most liberal domestic policies 
in the bloc, every country in Eastern Europe has reverted to domestic 
orthodoxy through economic recentralization, political purges, and 
ideological campaigns. The problem, of course, is to justify and 
to maintain the campaign of repression in an era characterized by the 
relaxation of tension in Europe.
The increased concern for political security in Eastern Europe 
explains the recent expansion of Warsaw Pact activities. By reaffirm­
ing the requirements of socialist internationalism, including those 
implicit in the Warsaw Pact, the East European leaders are able to 
provide at least some justification for the maintenance of domestic 
conservatism. The threat implicit in the Brezhnev Doctrine provides 
an additional source of justification. By alluding to the example 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and by pointing to the presence of Soviet 
troops in Eastern Europe, the East European leaders may justify 
domestic repression as being necessary for the maintenance of "correct" 
relations with Moscow. As was argued, with perhaps a touch of 
sarcasm, in the Hungarian press, "In its own national interest, a 
socialist country cannot do better than aim at close unity with the 
Soviet Union.
The paradox could hardly be more complete. The process of 
detente, far from promoting liberalism in Eastern Europe, has
•^^Nepszabadsag% Budapest, July 24, 1973, as cited by Charles 
Andras, "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," in East 
European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed..
Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974), p. 31.
100
contributed to a revival of domestic repression and renewed concern 
for bloc unity. In the long run, of course, detente and the expansion 
of East-West contacts may bring about profound changes in Eastern 
Europe. It is through an awareness of the possible long-range 
consequences of detente that the Soviet Union and its allies have 
stepped up the campaign for ideological unity in the bloc.
Ideological Unity and Disunity
Another paradox of the era of detente is that the expansion 
of pragmatic contacts between the communist countries and the advanced 
capitalist countries has been accompanied by an intensification of 
the communist ideological campaign. The Soviet press in particular 
has gone to some lengths to affirm the continuation of the "histori­
cally inevitable" class struggle. One article, significantly 
entitled "The Dialectics of Detente," argued,
Soviet-American relations are clear evidence that the 
peaceful coexistence policy is a dialectical blend of cooperation 
and struggle. . . . The normalization of Soviet-American relations 
shows what impressive results can be achieved for peace and 
international security without renouncing principle and the class 
approach.116
Thus at the same time the Soviet Union has expanded its con­
tacts with the historic "class enemies" in the West, the Soviet press 
has reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to Marxism-Leninism. This 
seeming contradiction was addressed by Robert Tucker, who argued,
Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in the process 
of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final
H^Jan Prazsky, "The Dialectics of Detente," World Marxist 
Review 17 (September 1974):128.
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goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the 
process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. 
For intensified verbal allegiance to ultimate ideological goals
belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.-^7
The same pattern has been demonstrated in the alliance during 
the period of detente. The "deradicalization" implicit in expanded 
East-West relations has been accompanied by ostentatious pronounce­
ments of ideological unity in Eastern Europe. As is the case in 
Soviet domestic policy, ideological unity in the alliance serves to 
justify domestic conservatism and to safeguard political security.
A number of developments not necessarily related to detente 
have prompted the new ideological campaign as well. Widespread 
political apathy, particularly among socialist youth, has tended to 
erode the source of political support in Eastern Europe. The new 
emphasis on consumer goods production, too, reflects the concerns 
of a populace increasingly interested in achieving a standard of 
living comparable to that in the West. Symptomatic of the growing 
domestic problems in Eastern Europe is the growth of small but vocal 
groups of political dissidents. "Thus," one Soviet journalist has 
concluded, "internal developments as well as the external political 
situation objectively [ demand ] closer cohesion and unity of the 
socialist countries.
H^Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist 
Movements," American Political Science Review 61 (June 1967):
358.
Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries— A Condition 
for Strengthening the Position of Socialism," International Affairs 
[ Moscow ], December 1973, p. 9.
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Obviously, socialist unity cannot be of the monolithic 
character known under Stalin. Soviet acceptance of different interpre­
tations of the correct path to socialism has been well demonstrated: 
examples include toleration of Rumania’s national self-assertiveness,
acceptance of Hungary's economic experimentation, the cautious
/
approaches to Poland's domestic crises of 1968 and 1970, and, most 
recently, the partial rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The new approach 
to socialist unity, conducted under the banner of "socialist 
internationalism,11 reflects a new willingness to acknowledge and 
accept polycentrism in the socialist camp.
Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1971, followed by the 1973 
visit by Kosygin, marked the beginning of the new drive for unity 
among the socialist states. The high point of Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations came in 1974, during talks in preparation for the pan- 
European conference of communist parties. Significantly, the talks 
were attended by representatives of the Yugoslav and Rumanian regimes, 
both of which had refused to send representatives to the 1967 
Karlovy Vary conference. During the first round of talks, a Yugoslav 
report suggested a new Soviet willingness to expand the conference 
decision-making procedures. "The rules of procedure," it was reported, 
"contain, among other things, those political-procedural problems, 
including the provision for decision-making by consensus, on which
103
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had i n s i s t e d . D e s p i t e  
the fact that new disputes have emerged since the time of the 
Yugoslav report, it is apparent that the Soviet Union continues to work 
to achieve at least the appearance of unity at the international 
conference. 120
The major effort of the Soviet ideological campaign, of 
course, has been to establish unity among the Warsaw Pact allies. In 
addition to the expansion of the activities of the Political 
Consultative Committee, efforts toward bloc unity have been manifested 
in an increase in the number of bilateral and multilateral meetings 
among top party officials. Moreover, a new forum for the expression 
of bloc unity has been added: a yearly conference of Soviet and East
European leaders in the Crimea.
In 1973, following the first conference in the Crimea, Soviet 
party leader Leonid Brezhnev noted, "participants in the Crimea 
meeting were unanimous in the opinion that at the present stage it is 
essential to improve considerably the standard of ideological coopera­
tion among the fraternal countries and parties. "121 nature of the
H^Radio Belgrade, October 16, 1974, as cited by Kevin Devlin, 
"The International Communist Movement: European Communist Conference,"
Radio Background Report/5 (Eastern Europe), Radio Free Europe Research, 
January 17, 1975, p. 10.
120-por an analysis of the continuing debate over the confer­
ence, see Kevin Devlin, "Pre-conference Debate Behind Closed Doors," 
Radio Background Report/31 (Pan-European Communist Conference), Radio 
Free Europe Research. February 26, 1975.
l^lRadio Moscow, August 15, 1973, as cited by Andras,
European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.
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meeting was made more clear in an article in the Czechoslovak news­
paper Rude Pravo. which argued that the meetings were made necessary 
by the fact that ’’the revival of international relations [ had ] 
activated anticommunist propaganda.11 The final goal of ideological 
consolidation, the article went on to say, must be "to protect the 
building of socialism at home against the aggressive endeavors of 
imperialism.
Thus by 1973 the implications of "socialist internationalism" 
had become clear. The intensive ideological campaign was designed 
to confront a threat seen in terms of political security rather than 
in terms of pure ideology. Similarly, Warsaw Pact activities were 
expanded to confront new problems of policy coordination and new 
threats to political security in Eastern Europe. In the face of 
expanded East-West trade relations, economic integration through 
COMECON was designed to establish new and long-term links among 
the states of Eastern Europe.
Internal alliance developments were, of course, closely 
related to the emerging pattern of Soviet bloc detente diplomacy. As 
Leonid Brezhnev emphasized at the 1973 Crimea meeting, "The cohesion 
of the socialist countries and our close interaction are at the basis 
of everything we have secured in relaxing tension."123
122Rude Pravo, August 25, 1973, as cited by Andras, "European 
Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.
Incited by Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries," p. 11.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION: DETENTE AND
ALLIANCE COHESION
An assumption widely shared among Western observers--scholars 
and statesmen alike--is that the normalization of East-West relations 
will lead ultimately to a loosening of the bonds between the Soviet 
Union and its East European allies. While it is still too early to 
render a final judgment, recent developments in the East European 
alliance suggest the opposite conclusion. The process of detente, 
far from contributing to the disintegration of the alliance, has 
served to stimulate a renewed drive for alliance cohesion.
The relationship between internal and external developments 
does, however, provide some insight into the nature of East European 
integration, for one way of judging the viability of any system is 
to assess the ability of the system to react and adapt to changes 
in its external environment. As Morton Kaplan has proposed, "The 
stability or flexibility of a system depends upon its capacity to 
overcome environmental disturbances .
The changes in alliance relationships between the early 
1950s and the mid-1960s were primarily attributable to the profound
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 99
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changes taking place domestically in Eastern Europe. In the early 
years of the alliance, cohesion was imposed by the Soviet Union on 
East European regimes which were scarcely in a position to resist.
Once the East European regimes had gained and consolidated power, 
however, they were soon faced with domestic crises which demanded 
new forms of alliance relations. The response to these new demands 
was Khrushchev's attempt to create a more complex and resilient 
alliance framework through a revived COMECON and through the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization. For the remainder of the Khrushchev era, it 
was primarily the interplay between domestic developments and 
alliance relations which determined the course of integration in the 
alliance. Aside from the disruptions of polycentric Communism, the 
international environment remained generally stable until the early 
1960s.
Since that time, however, the situation has been reversed. 
Domestic disruptions in Eastern Europe have, if not disappeared, 
at least subsided, but profound changes in the international environ­
ment have created new demands for the alliance system. An interesting 
commentary was recently provided by a Soviet journalist, who, refer­
ring to crises in NATO relations, argued that "these developments 
have once again exposed the futile and outdated character of the old 
structure . . . , a structure that was adapted to the period of tough
107
125confrontation with the socialist world," The same line of argu­
ment, of course, could be applied equally well to the crisis faced 
in the East European alliance system, which was adapted to confront
the perceived threat from the West.
Since the early 1960s, the tight bipolar system, characterized 
by "tough confrontation" between the two power blocs, has given way to 
a much more fluid and unstable situation. The gradual process of 
East-West detente, which dates at least from the 1963 Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, has accelerated rapidly since 1970. The improvement in 
Soviet-American relations and, more importantly, the settlement of 
the territorial disputes in central Europe have dramatically altered 
the nature of the international system. Thus by 1974, a Soviet 
analyst could argue, "By the early 1970fs, the prerequisites for a
radical restructuring of the system of contemporary international
126relations developed on the world scene."
In addition to demanding new forms of interbloc relations,
the altered international situation required new forms of relations 
within the Soviet bl8c. Associated with the new interbloc situation 
were a number of specific concerns, including the rapid expansion of 
East-West trade, the development of increased human contacts with
125Y. Davydov, "USA--Western Europe: A 'New Relationship,’"
International Affairs [ Moscow ], January 1974, pp. 36-37.
Davydov, who had been a frequent contributor to 
International Affairs, defected to the West while on assignment to 
Japan early in 1975.
126
A. Stepanov, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Restructuring 
of International Relations," International Affairs [ Moscow ],
January 1974, p. 5.
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the West, and the decline of military tension in Europe. The nature 
of alliance change in response to these developments has been examined 
in some detail. Through a new drive for economic integration, an 
expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, 
and an intensive ideological campaign, the East European alliance 
has adapted to the requirements of the altered external environment.
By the opening of preliminary negotiations for a conference 
on security and cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki in late 1972 
and early 1973, the second half of the new alliance strategy began 
to emerge. During the preliminary meetings and during the Conference 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the talks on Mutual Force 
Reductions in Europe, both of which began in 1973, the nature of the 
coordinated alliance policy became more clear. Intimately tied to 
the development of new relations within the bloc, the alliance posi­
tion at the sessions in Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna represented a 
coordinated vision of a restructured interbloc situation in Europe.
Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna
Soviet and East European initiatives toward a conference on 
security and cooperation in Europe actually date from the signing of 
the Warsaw Pact, in which the allies affirmed "their desire to 
create a system of collective security in Europe based on the parti­
cipation of all European States, irrespective of their social and
109
127political structure." In 1955 and in the decade which followed, 
Warsaw Pact proposals were motivated by the desire for the recogni­
tion of the post-World War Two boundaries in Europe. In 1965, with 
the territorial situation in Europe considerably more stable, the 
Warsaw Pact allies issued a more urgent proposal for "the convocation
of a conference of all European states to discuss measures ensuring
128collective security in Europe."
By the time of the 1969 Budapest Message, the Warsaw Pact 
position reflected a more serious desire to confront the new situa­
tion in Europe. Moreover, the Budapest appeal betrayed the existence 
of conflicting views among Warsaw Pact members as to the nature and 
purpose of the proposed conference. As Harland Cleveland, former 
United States representative to the North Atlantic Council, observed,
A close reading of the Budapest appeal suggested a hard-fought 
compromise: The Soviets got their appeal . . , The East German
and Polish "Hawks" got the pre-conditions on which they had been 
insisting; and the Czech and Hungarian "Doves" managed to delete 
most of the traditional polemics. ^ 9
It might also be added that, through the reference to "respect for the
127United Nations, Treaty Series, Treaties and International 
Agreements Registered or Filed and Reported with the Secretariat of 
the United Nations, vol. 219 (1955), No. 2962, "The Warsaw Treaty," 
14 May 1955.
128"Session of Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw 
Treaty States Communique," Pravda, January 22, 1965, translated in 
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 17, February 10, 1965,
129 * /Cited by Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente
Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970*5 (New
York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1970), p. 85.
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130independence and sovereignty of states," the Rumanians got the 
formal guarantees on which they had insisted.
Beyond the differences revealed in the Budapest Message were 
a number of basic differences among the Warsaw Pact allies. The East 
Germans, because of the GDR's advantageous position as the principal 
exporter of finished goods in COMECON and because of the leadership's 
acute fear of ideological infection, were wary of East-West coopera­
tion in any form. At the other extreme were the Rumanians, bent on 
using the process of detente as a means of loosening the Soviet grip 
on Eastern Europe. Between these two extreme positions were a number 
of other sources of disagreement in Eastern Europe. Hungary, for 
example, because of its success through bilateral trade arrangements 
with the West and through regional cooperation, showed little interest
in pursuing a collective approach toward East-West economic coopera- 
131tion.
Nevertheless, between 1969 and 1972 the Soviet Union was able 
to promote a substantially unified bloc position toward East-West 
cooperation. Aside from Rumania's Ceausescu, the East European 
leaders generally consider the continued presence of Soviet troops to 
be useful, and perhaps necessary, for the preservation of domestic 
political security. In terms of economic relations, East European
130Pravda, May 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press 21, April 2, 1969, p. 12.
131For a comprehensive study of East European policy posi­
tions, see Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean, eds., East European 
Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974), pp. 102-90.
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leaders share an interest in expanded East-West trade, and they per­
ceive the advantages of presenting a coordinated position in dealing 
with the West. Similarly, there is full agreement that relations with 
the West must be regulated in such a way as to minimize the possibility 
of introducing liberalizing tendencies into the socialist societies.
As the Warsaw Pact position became more unified, the pro­
posals for a European security conference became more specific. The 
Prague Declaration of October 31, 1969, set two priorities for the 
proposed conference: the first was a vague recommendation for a
statement renouncing the use of force in Europe, and the second was
a call for nthe expansion of trade, economic and scientific and tech- 
132nical ties." From that time on, it has been clear that the main
Warsaw Pact objective is economic cooperation in specific, limited 
spheres of activity. Notably absent from the Prague Declaration was 
any mention of mutual force reductions in Europe. In subsequent pro­
posals, too, the Warsaw Pact policy has been simply to avoid the 
issue of troop reductions.
The NATO response to the Prague Declaration revealed three 
obstacles to holding the conference: the issue of boundaries in
central Europe, the question of the inclusion of the United States 
in the conference, and the issue of the proper scope of the talks, 
particularly with regard to the issue of force reductions. Between 
1969 and 1972, West German Ostpolitik successfully resolved the issue
Pravda, November 1, 1969, as translated in The Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press 21, November 26, 1969, p. 19.
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of European boundaries. The other two obstacles, however, were the 
subject of intense debate between NATO and the WTO.
The United States was instrumental in establishing a negative
NATO response to the vague proposals in the Prague Declaration.
"Why not, the Americans said, get down to cases and ask the other side
133
where it stood on balanced and mutual force reductions in Europe?"
The issue of symmetrical versus asymmetrical cuts, or balanced versus 
imbalanced reductions, has remained the principal obstacle in the MFR 
talks. From the NATO perspective, force reductions in central Europe 
must be "balanced," rather than equal, to reflect the Warsaw Pact 
numerical advantage in troop levels. The Warsaw Pact position, by 
contrast, was that the word "balanced" should be removed from pro­
posed talks and that force reduction talks should be held separately 
from the broader Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Agreement on M(B)FR was eventually achieved through the 
Warsaw Pact "concession" on American participation, an issue which 
was obviously raised as a bargaining card for the WTO negotiating 
position. In return for the Warsaw Pact’s acceptance of American 
participation, and in return for an apparent concession on the nature 
of force reductions, the NATO Council finally agreed "that multilateral 
explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as 
soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral 
preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
133New York Times, November 9, 1969, sec. IV, p. 6.
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Europe.*’ The Council resolution went on to say, however, that the
conference should also concern itself with the free movement of 
people, ideas, and information between East and West Europe.
As agreed, the preliminary negotiations for force reduction 
talks and for the European Security Conference were held separately. 
Although the preparatory talks for the Conference on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions officially opened in Vienna on January 31, 
1973, the first plenary session did not meet until May 14 because of 
procedural differences over participation. As expected, the principal 
source of disagreement was the question of ’’balanced” force reductions. 
In the final communique of the preparatory talks a compromise solu­
tion was reached: the word ’’balanced” was dropped in return for the
guarantee that any decision reached would ’’conform to the principle
135of undiminished security for each party.” It was further agreed
that the first phase of the MFR talks would be held in Vienna in 
October.
The preliminary negotiations for the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe were held in Helsinki during four sessions 
from November, 1972, to June, 1973. As was the case in the MFR nego­
tiations, the Warsaw Pact strategy was to make concessions which were 
sufficiently vague that they could later be reversed. On the issue of 
human and cultural contacts, for example, the Soviet Union agreed that
13^i*
New York Times, February 20, 1972. [ Emphasis added. ]
135Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's
Publications, 1974), p. 26315.
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the agenda could include discussions on the "expansion of cultural
co-operation, of contacts between organizations and individuals, and
136
of dissemination of information." The only evidence of Warsaw
Pact dissension was Rumania's successful insistence that the conference
137take place "outside the military alliances." Having agreed on a
general agenda for CSCE, the participants opened the first phase of 
the conference in Helsinki on July 3.
Although it lasted for only four days, the first phase of 
CSCE established the basic positions of both East and West. In a 
reversal of the previous Soviet proposal, Foreign Minister Gromyko 
argued,
It is clear that co-operation in the cultural field, and the 
development of contacts and of exchanges of information, should 
be carried out with full observance of the principles . . .  of 
sovereignty and non-interference. Any departure from this would 
be rightfully regarded as an attempt to intrude upon another's 
affairs.138
Representing the general view of the West, British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home countered by arguing that it is
essential that we should do something to remove the barriers 
which inhibit the movement of peoples and the exchange of infor­
mation and ideas. . . . The peoples of our countries . . . want 
to know whether their lives will be affected for the better by
our efforts.139
By the time the second phase of negotiations began in Geneva
136Ibid., p. 25699.
137Ibid., p. 26013.
138Ibid., p. 26014. 
139
Ibid., p. 26015.
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in September, 1973, East and West were firmly divided over the 
"Basket Three" proposals regarding human and cultural contacts. From 
the point of view of the West, any meaningful normalization of rela­
tions between East and West should include the expansion of human 
and cultural contacts. Implicit in the Western position, of course, 
was the belief that expansion of human contacts would lead to the 
liberalization of the socialist societies and to a loosening of the 
Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact posi­
tion, reinforced through frequent bilateral and multilateral meetings 
among top party leaders and through meetings of the PCC, has been that 
the CSCE should result in a resolution formally legitimizing European 
borders and establishing, without reference to "Basket Three" pro­
posals, a new framework for East-West economic cooperation.
By mid-1975, the Warsaw Pact nations had realized most of their 
CSCE objectives. By offering minor concessions, such as agreeing to 
a proposal to reunite families separated by the now rusty Iron 
Curtain, the Soviet bloc had elicited the reluctant agreement of the 
West. The final CSCE declaration included a statement on the inviola­
bility of European borders, an agreement on noninterference in internal 
affairs, a general agreement on the possibility of peaceful border
change, and a vague statement on the virtues of expanded flows of
140people and ideas between East and West.
It became apparent early that an agreement on MFR could not
For a recent assessment of the security conference, see 
Scott Thornton, "Helsinki Summit: New Era or False Hopes,"
Washington Post, July 23, 1975, p. 17.*
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be timed to coincide with the CSCE resolution. Throughout the MFR 
negotiations, which have remained virtually stalled since they began 
in October of 1973, East and West have been deadlocked over a number 
of questions: whether troop cuts should be symmetrical or asym­
metrical, who should participate in the initial cuts, whether or not 
the cuts should include nuclear armaments, and whether or not cuts 
should include air as well as ground forces. The only perceptible 
area of agreement was in the decision to provide a few days' 
advance notice of military maneuvers.
It has been clear from the start of MFR that the Warsaw Pact 
objective was to prevent an agreement on force reductions. From the 
perspectives of the East European leaders, the maintenance of the 
power balance in Europe is not enough: the political leadership in
Eastern Europe, with the exception of Ceausescu, considers the main­
tenance of current troop levels to be essential for the preservation 
of political security. Once the initial Warsaw Pact aim--the separa­
tion of MFR from the broader security conference--was achieved, the 
Warsaw Pact position was to oppose any NATO proposal on force reduc­
tions .
From an assessment of the CSCE resolution and the MFR talks at 
their present stage, it is clear that no new Concert of Europe is in 
the offing. It is equally clear that the conferences will yield no 
specific blueprint for the future of East-West relations in Europe. 
Nevertheless, a number of objectives of the Warsaw Pact countries 
have already been realized. First, the resolution on the inviolabi­
lity of European borders serves to institutionalize the status quo
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in central Europe. Second, the agreement on noninterference in inter­
nal affairs serves to legitimize the existing nature of political 
control in Eastern Europe. Finally, by having avoided major conces­
sions on the issue of human and cultural exchanges, the Soviet bloc 
will be able to promote limited cooperation with the West on a 
strictly government-to-government basis. In other words, the CSCE 
resolution helps enable the Warsaw Pact countries to regulate the 
pattern of East-West exchanges in such a way as to minimize the danger 
of ideological "infection."
Of course, the conference resolution has established only a 
very general framework for East-West cooperation. A major question 
is whether the Soviet Union and its allies can continue to promote 
expanded relations with the West without introducing substantial 
changes into the socialist societies. As has been made clear, it is 
through an awareness of the possible consequences of detente that the 
Soviet and East European leaders have maintained their determination 
to control the character of East-West relations. Once the flow of 
events begins to exceed the capacity of the Warsaw Pact leaders to 
deal with them, the new form of cooperation with the West may well 
be reversed.
Beyond Detente
To an extent unparalleled in the history of the East European 
alliance, the course of alliance integration in the future will be 
determined by the nature of external developments. Domestically, the 
process of East-West cooperation has provided the East European
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leaders with an opportunity to revive their stagnant economies, pro­
mote greater consumer goods production, and, ultimately, bolster their 
political security by establishing a firmer relationship between the 
party and the people. At the same time, the process of detente has 
contributed to a drive for alliance unity through improved economic 
integration, political coordination, and ideological regeneration.
In order to achieve their objectives in East-West cooperation, 
the East European leaders have demonstrated considerable solidarity 
at the pan-European conferences. In an important sense, however, 
the solidarity of the past few years is deceptive, for among the East 
European leaders there are two opposing tendencies: one impelling
them toward closer unity in the interests of immediate political secu­
rity, and the other impelling them to seek greater independence from 
the Soviet Union. This second inclination is seen in terms of a long­
term process through which the East European leaders, following a
♦
period of growing cooperation with the West, will be able to exercise 
greater latitude in order to satisfy the needs of their increasingly 
restive populaces and restore public confidence in the party.
These two tendencies are far from inconsistent. For the 
immediate present, close alliance unity and "firm friendship with the 
Soviet Union," to repeat Ulbricht's phrase, are absolutely required 
to control the character of East-West relations. Once East-West rela­
tions have been established on a new, firmer basis, however, the oppor­
tunity may present itself for new forms of relations within the bloc.
It is well-recognized, of course, that the Soviet Union is presently 
in a position to block any developments perceived to be detrimental to
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Soviet interests. The hope in Eastern Europe is that the Soviet Union, 
in the belief that its position in the bloc is secure, will permit a 
greater degree of independence in Eastern Europe.
Clearly, whatever independence is gained in Eastern Europe
will be of a limited sort. As one Polish scholar has argued, the
era of detente will bring with it "a shifting of forces within the 
141blocs.1’ The ties within the bloc--economic, political, and
ideological--are sufficiently strong to assure that any changes or 
"shifting of forces" which may occur will take place within the 
existing alliance framework. Moreover, Soviet determination to main­
tain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, reinforced by prepon­
derant Soviet power, dictates the limits of independence in the bloc.
If there is a model for the desired result of this "shifting 
of forces," it is that of the Hungarians, not the Rumanians. The kind 
of self-assertiveness in foreign policy familiar in Rumania for a 
decade would not be in the interests of the other East European 
countries, nor would "another Rumania" be tolerated by the Soviet 
Union. The experience of Hungary in the past few years has consider­
ably more appeal. Through the gradual implementation of economic 
reforms and through the cultivation of beneficial trade relations with 
the West, Hungary has been able to achieve what is desired most in
141Jan Sczepanski, "The Fate of Poland and the Polish 
Character," Zycie Warszawy, June 4, 1970, as cited by Robert W. Dean, 
"Foreign Policy Perspectives and European Security: Poland and
Czechoslovakia," in East European Perspectives on European Security 
and Cooperation, ed . Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 122.
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Eastern Europe: economic viability and a form of political security
based on the general support of the population. Moreover, the 
Hungarian leadership has been able to achieve its success without 
damaging the leading role of the party.
Whether or not the '’shifting of forces” occurs depends on 
two factors: the nature of domestic change in Eastern Europe and
the progress of East-West cooperation. In the first case, the East 
European leaders are well aware that they will be treading a thin 
line between expanding the scope of political support on the one 
hand and creating the kind of chaos which occurred in Czechoslovakia 
on the other. Any repetition of the Czechoslovak experience, with its 
economic experimentation and its acknowledgment of political plural­
ism, would result in action as determined, if not as brutal, as the 
1968 invasion. Moreover, any domestic disruptions would raise fears 
for political security and would prompt another drive for bloc 
unity, a drive which would be supported by the East European as well 
as the Soviet leaders.
The second factor affecting alliance change will be the 
progress of detente. It is clear that the Soviet and East European 
leaders have great hopes that the new form of cooperation with the 
West will provide a partial solution to their economic and political 
problems. One possibility is that the East European leaders may 
gain through the process of East-West cooperation sufficient security
For an assessment of the situation in Hungary, see Peter 
Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1972), pp. 100-11.
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to permit a gradual relaxation of internal policies. If internal 
change occurs precipitously as the result of expanded East-West 
contacts, however, the process of detente may well be reversed in 
the interests of bloc unity and political security.
The long process of East European integration has resulted 
in substantial and durable ties between the Soviet Union and the 
states of Eastern Europe. Within the existing framework, however, 
there is room for substantial change in alliance relationships.
It may well be that the process of East-West cooperation fails to 
yield the specific benefits expected in Eastern Europe, or that the 
process brings with it liberalizing elements which cannot be toler­
ated. If either of these two possibilities materialize, the result 
may be a reversal of d^tenteand a return to domestic repression and 
orthodoxy.
There is, however, a more optimistic view of the future. 
According to this scenario, the progress of East-West cooperation 
will promote mutually beneficial relations and will lead to a situa­
tion in which the East European leaders feel sufficiently secure to 
permit, with the endorsement of the Soviet Union, a gradual liberali­
zation of domestic policies.
In any case, it should be remembered that the objectives of 
the two blocs remain basically opposed. The current era of detente 
is the product, not of the abandonment of basic objectives, but of 
the existence of an East-West power balance and of the recognition « 
that certain objectives can better be achieved through cooperation 
than through confrontation. For the near future, the best that can be
hoped from the process of detente is that the "shifting of forces 
will encourage greater stability and cooperation within the frame 
work of existing alliances.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CEMA )
CMEA )
COMECON ) Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EEC European Economic Community (Common Market)
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MFR Mutual Force Reductions
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCC Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization 
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization
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